Pub Date : 1900-01-01DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198862390.003.0003
D. Papineau
In this chapter some initial arguments for representationalism are considered and dismissed. Naturalist representationalism is distinguished from phenomenal intentionalism and shown to be implausible. Appeals to the ‘transparency’ of experience are considered and shown to be problematic. These doubts are put on a more explicit footing and are shown to lead to a general argument that conscious sensory properties cannot possibly be essentially representational. Phenomenal intentionalism is argued to collapse into the qualitative view.
{"title":"Against Representationalism","authors":"D. Papineau","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780198862390.003.0003","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198862390.003.0003","url":null,"abstract":"In this chapter some initial arguments for representationalism are considered and dismissed. Naturalist representationalism is distinguished from phenomenal intentionalism and shown to be implausible. Appeals to the ‘transparency’ of experience are considered and shown to be problematic. These doubts are put on a more explicit footing and are shown to lead to a general argument that conscious sensory properties cannot possibly be essentially representational. Phenomenal intentionalism is argued to collapse into the qualitative view.","PeriodicalId":317000,"journal":{"name":"The Metaphysics of Sensory Experience","volume":"121 9","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"120818693","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 1900-01-01DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198862390.003.0002
D. Papineau
This chapter sets the stage. It clarifies ‘sensory experience’ and related concepts. It offers arguments against both naïve realism and sense-datum theories. It distinguishes different kinds of representationalism about sensory experience along with a number of further issues that can be put to one side.
{"title":"Clearing the Ground","authors":"D. Papineau","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780198862390.003.0002","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198862390.003.0002","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter sets the stage. It clarifies ‘sensory experience’ and related concepts. It offers arguments against both naïve realism and sense-datum theories. It distinguishes different kinds of representationalism about sensory experience along with a number of further issues that can be put to one side.","PeriodicalId":317000,"journal":{"name":"The Metaphysics of Sensory Experience","volume":"49 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115807074","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 1900-01-01DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198862390.003.0004
D. Papineau
In this chapter, the qualitative view is outlined and shown to avoid the problems facing representationalism. The qualitative view is defended as a ‘pure paint’ view and distinguished from the ‘partial paint’ views of Block and Peacocke. The structure of experience is acknowledged. ‘Intentional objects’ are explained, and the dangers of equating them with elements of experience are exposed. The idea that mental ‘paint’ might ‘point’ is discredited.
{"title":"The Structure of Experience","authors":"D. Papineau","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780198862390.003.0004","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198862390.003.0004","url":null,"abstract":"In this chapter, the qualitative view is outlined and shown to avoid the problems facing representationalism. The qualitative view is defended as a ‘pure paint’ view and distinguished from the ‘partial paint’ views of Block and Peacocke. The structure of experience is acknowledged. ‘Intentional objects’ are explained, and the dangers of equating them with elements of experience are exposed. The idea that mental ‘paint’ might ‘point’ is discredited.","PeriodicalId":317000,"journal":{"name":"The Metaphysics of Sensory Experience","volume":"15 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124210879","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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