什么是语言哲学与认识论的实验研究?

R. Barash, P. Kusliy
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引用次数: 0

摘要

哲学是一门抽象的理论学科。然而,在哲学研究中,一种发展实验方法的新趋势正在逐渐流行起来,并延伸到以前没有看到实验方法的哲学研究领域。这篇文章讨论了是否有可能用经验方法来研究哲学问题。两个研究领域被考虑-语言和语义的哲学和认识论。在哲学的这些分支领域中,实验方法的应用最近取得了显著的进展。在那些支持某一特定理论的论证是基于对我们直觉的研究的学科中,经验主义方法是合理的。实验只是为了获得我们直觉的更客观的表征,而哲学论证是在这些直觉的基础上进一步建立起来的。作者认为,实验方法在语义学上的运用与意义的反心理主义是相容的。后一点尤其有争议,因为语言直觉或关于意义的直觉通常被视为说话者有明确认知途径的东西。然而,当实验研究(即使它是一个受控判断的集合)显示的结果与该领域先前的假设不同时,就需要进行修订。作者回顾了几个要求进一步修订的此类反驳案例,并认为此类实验工作有助于语言哲学和认识论的论点在他们所建立的经验数据方面获得更坚实的基础。在语言哲学和理论语言学中,本文探讨的案例涉及到有冠词和没有冠词的语言之间的差异,以及对这些表达的某些解释的可用性或缺乏的预测。进一步说明了如何在研究“most”的含义时使用类似的方法来识别存在或不存在的解释。在认识论方面,本文讨论了最近关于知识归属的一些实验工作的结果。演讲者对著名的谷仓例子的直觉最近被证明与哲学家们所声称的不同,他们在有争议的不正确的数据上建立了他们深远的论点。
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What Is Experimental Research in the Philosophy of Language and Epistemology?
Philosophy is an abstract theoretical discipline. However, a new trend that develops experimental methods in philosophical research has recently been gaining popularity extending to the fields of philosophical research that have not seen experimental methods earlier. This article addresses the question of whether it is possible to investigate philosophical questions with empirical methods. Two areas of research are considered – philosophy of language and semantics and epistemology. In these subfields of philosophy, the application of experimental methods has recently lead to a noticeable progress. Empirical methods are justified in those disciplines in which arguments in favor of a particular theory are based on the study of our intuitions. Experiments only serve to obtain more objective representations of our intuitions, and philosophical argumentation is built further based on these intuitions. The authors argue that the use of experimental methods in semantics is compatible with anti-psychologism about meaning. The latter point is particularly controversial because linguistic intuitions or intuitions about the meaning have often been viewed as something that speakers have clear cognitive access to. However, when experimental research (even when it is a collection of controlled judgments) shows results that are different from what the field has been previously assuming, a revision is called for. The authors review several cases of such refutations calling for further revisions and argue that such experimental work helps arguments in philosophy of language and epistemology gain more sound ground with respect to the empirical data that they build on. In philosophy of language and theoretical linguistics, the cases explored in this article relate to the differences between languages with and without articles and to the predictions about the availability of certain interpretations of such expressions or lack thereof. It is further shown how a similar method of identifying the existent or non-existent interpretations was used in the studies of the meaning of “most”. In epistemology, the article discusses the results of some recent experimental work relating to the knowledge ascriptions. The speakers’ intuitions about the famous Barn-examples have recently been shown to diverge from what philosophers have claimed, building their far-reaching arguments on the data that was arguably incorrect.
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