Yunkai Bai, Jungmin Park, M. Tehranipoor, Domenic Forte
{"title":"基于互信息的双通道电磁/功率攻击及其实时实现","authors":"Yunkai Bai, Jungmin Park, M. Tehranipoor, Domenic Forte","doi":"10.1109/HOST55118.2023.10133261","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Cryptosystem implementations often leak information about a secret key due to correlation with side channels such as power, timing, EM, etc. Based on this principle, statistical and machine-learning-based side-channel attacks have been investigated, most often using a single channel or modality such as power; however, EM is growing in popularity. Since power and EM channels can leak distinct information, the combination of EM and power channels could increase side-channel attack efficiency. In this paper, we combine EM and power channels in a linear fashion by using mutual information to determine the optimal coefficients for each feature. Mutual information is also systematically applied for lightweight dimensionality reduction. Further, the proposed methodology is implemented onto a platform to simultaneously measure power and EM traces and process them in real time to extract AES subkeys. With the proposed dual channel approach, the success rate increases by at least 30% compared to single power/EM channels in the offline mode and over 50% in the real-time mode.","PeriodicalId":128125,"journal":{"name":"2023 IEEE International Symposium on Hardware Oriented Security and Trust (HOST)","volume":"27 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2023-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Dual Channel EM/Power Attack Using Mutual Information and its Real-time Implementation\",\"authors\":\"Yunkai Bai, Jungmin Park, M. Tehranipoor, Domenic Forte\",\"doi\":\"10.1109/HOST55118.2023.10133261\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"Cryptosystem implementations often leak information about a secret key due to correlation with side channels such as power, timing, EM, etc. Based on this principle, statistical and machine-learning-based side-channel attacks have been investigated, most often using a single channel or modality such as power; however, EM is growing in popularity. Since power and EM channels can leak distinct information, the combination of EM and power channels could increase side-channel attack efficiency. In this paper, we combine EM and power channels in a linear fashion by using mutual information to determine the optimal coefficients for each feature. Mutual information is also systematically applied for lightweight dimensionality reduction. Further, the proposed methodology is implemented onto a platform to simultaneously measure power and EM traces and process them in real time to extract AES subkeys. With the proposed dual channel approach, the success rate increases by at least 30% compared to single power/EM channels in the offline mode and over 50% in the real-time mode.\",\"PeriodicalId\":128125,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"2023 IEEE International Symposium on Hardware Oriented Security and Trust (HOST)\",\"volume\":\"27 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2023-05-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"2023 IEEE International Symposium on Hardware Oriented Security and Trust (HOST)\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1109/HOST55118.2023.10133261\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"2023 IEEE International Symposium on Hardware Oriented Security and Trust (HOST)","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1109/HOST55118.2023.10133261","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
Dual Channel EM/Power Attack Using Mutual Information and its Real-time Implementation
Cryptosystem implementations often leak information about a secret key due to correlation with side channels such as power, timing, EM, etc. Based on this principle, statistical and machine-learning-based side-channel attacks have been investigated, most often using a single channel or modality such as power; however, EM is growing in popularity. Since power and EM channels can leak distinct information, the combination of EM and power channels could increase side-channel attack efficiency. In this paper, we combine EM and power channels in a linear fashion by using mutual information to determine the optimal coefficients for each feature. Mutual information is also systematically applied for lightweight dimensionality reduction. Further, the proposed methodology is implemented onto a platform to simultaneously measure power and EM traces and process them in real time to extract AES subkeys. With the proposed dual channel approach, the success rate increases by at least 30% compared to single power/EM channels in the offline mode and over 50% in the real-time mode.