{"title":"捆绑销售是否会导致保险中的逆向选择?","authors":"Francis Annan","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3611230","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Bundling credit with insurance contracts is a common approach to increasing insurance take-up, especially in low income-environments. I document that this approach can induce adverse selection in insurance; thus, acting as an important source of inefficiency.","PeriodicalId":119201,"journal":{"name":"Microeconomics: Asymmetric & Private Information eJournal","volume":"107 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2020-04-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"2","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Does Bundling Induce Adverse Selection in Insurance?\",\"authors\":\"Francis Annan\",\"doi\":\"10.2139/ssrn.3611230\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"Abstract Bundling credit with insurance contracts is a common approach to increasing insurance take-up, especially in low income-environments. I document that this approach can induce adverse selection in insurance; thus, acting as an important source of inefficiency.\",\"PeriodicalId\":119201,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Microeconomics: Asymmetric & Private Information eJournal\",\"volume\":\"107 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2020-04-09\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"2\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Microeconomics: Asymmetric & Private Information eJournal\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3611230\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Microeconomics: Asymmetric & Private Information eJournal","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3611230","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
Does Bundling Induce Adverse Selection in Insurance?
Abstract Bundling credit with insurance contracts is a common approach to increasing insurance take-up, especially in low income-environments. I document that this approach can induce adverse selection in insurance; thus, acting as an important source of inefficiency.
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