{"title":"政党提名和选举说服","authors":"J. Sinclair","doi":"10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190860806.013.48","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"US nominating institutions do not always seem to work as the conventional wisdom suggests they should. This chapter explores the intellectual puzzles of the US primary election literature, connects them to a broader comparative literature on nominations, and examines recent differences between the United States and United Kingdom. The expected relationship between institutional design and political outcomes is complicated by the environments for electoral persuasion. The chapter proposes that some recent innovations, such as California’s “top-two” procedure, provide a potentially fruitful area of research for scholars to investigate the interaction between party nominations and electoral persuasion.","PeriodicalId":184516,"journal":{"name":"The Oxford Handbook of Electoral Persuasion","volume":"12 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2020-06-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Party Nominations and Electoral Persuasion\",\"authors\":\"J. Sinclair\",\"doi\":\"10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190860806.013.48\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"US nominating institutions do not always seem to work as the conventional wisdom suggests they should. This chapter explores the intellectual puzzles of the US primary election literature, connects them to a broader comparative literature on nominations, and examines recent differences between the United States and United Kingdom. The expected relationship between institutional design and political outcomes is complicated by the environments for electoral persuasion. The chapter proposes that some recent innovations, such as California’s “top-two” procedure, provide a potentially fruitful area of research for scholars to investigate the interaction between party nominations and electoral persuasion.\",\"PeriodicalId\":184516,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"The Oxford Handbook of Electoral Persuasion\",\"volume\":\"12 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2020-06-04\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"The Oxford Handbook of Electoral Persuasion\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190860806.013.48\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"The Oxford Handbook of Electoral Persuasion","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190860806.013.48","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
US nominating institutions do not always seem to work as the conventional wisdom suggests they should. This chapter explores the intellectual puzzles of the US primary election literature, connects them to a broader comparative literature on nominations, and examines recent differences between the United States and United Kingdom. The expected relationship between institutional design and political outcomes is complicated by the environments for electoral persuasion. The chapter proposes that some recent innovations, such as California’s “top-two” procedure, provide a potentially fruitful area of research for scholars to investigate the interaction between party nominations and electoral persuasion.