{"title":"面向证明的高保证系统编程","authors":"Aseem Rastogi","doi":"10.1145/3578527.3581769","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Proof-oriented programming is a paradigm where programs are designed and developed along with mathematical proofs of their correctness and security. In recent years, proof-oriented programming has reached a point where not only several high-assurance software components have been developed using it, but these components have also been deployed in production systems. In this talk, I will provide an overview of this paradigm in the context of F*, a proof-oriented programming language developed at Microsoft Research. I will briefly discuss several critical software components, developed from scratch in F*. These components are already deployed in production systems such as Windows Hyper-V, the Linux kernel, Firefox, and mbedTLS. As a complementary methodology for retrofitting strong, formal guarantees on existing legacy services, I will present the Zeta framework. Zeta works by running a small, proven correct monitor in a trusted execution environment validating responses from the service. The key idea is that we only need to develop the monitor using proof-oriented programming once-and-for-all, while the large legacy service remains untrusted. I will illustrate Zeta by sketching an example of how we can make a concurrent, high-performance, key-value store \"zero trust\" and argue that this step incurs modest software engineering effort and modest runtime overheads.","PeriodicalId":326318,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 16th Innovations in Software Engineering Conference","volume":"41 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2023-02-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Proof-oriented programming for high-assurance systems\",\"authors\":\"Aseem Rastogi\",\"doi\":\"10.1145/3578527.3581769\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"Proof-oriented programming is a paradigm where programs are designed and developed along with mathematical proofs of their correctness and security. In recent years, proof-oriented programming has reached a point where not only several high-assurance software components have been developed using it, but these components have also been deployed in production systems. In this talk, I will provide an overview of this paradigm in the context of F*, a proof-oriented programming language developed at Microsoft Research. I will briefly discuss several critical software components, developed from scratch in F*. These components are already deployed in production systems such as Windows Hyper-V, the Linux kernel, Firefox, and mbedTLS. As a complementary methodology for retrofitting strong, formal guarantees on existing legacy services, I will present the Zeta framework. Zeta works by running a small, proven correct monitor in a trusted execution environment validating responses from the service. The key idea is that we only need to develop the monitor using proof-oriented programming once-and-for-all, while the large legacy service remains untrusted. I will illustrate Zeta by sketching an example of how we can make a concurrent, high-performance, key-value store \\\"zero trust\\\" and argue that this step incurs modest software engineering effort and modest runtime overheads.\",\"PeriodicalId\":326318,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Proceedings of the 16th Innovations in Software Engineering Conference\",\"volume\":\"41 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2023-02-23\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Proceedings of the 16th Innovations in Software Engineering Conference\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1145/3578527.3581769\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Proceedings of the 16th Innovations in Software Engineering Conference","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3578527.3581769","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
Proof-oriented programming for high-assurance systems
Proof-oriented programming is a paradigm where programs are designed and developed along with mathematical proofs of their correctness and security. In recent years, proof-oriented programming has reached a point where not only several high-assurance software components have been developed using it, but these components have also been deployed in production systems. In this talk, I will provide an overview of this paradigm in the context of F*, a proof-oriented programming language developed at Microsoft Research. I will briefly discuss several critical software components, developed from scratch in F*. These components are already deployed in production systems such as Windows Hyper-V, the Linux kernel, Firefox, and mbedTLS. As a complementary methodology for retrofitting strong, formal guarantees on existing legacy services, I will present the Zeta framework. Zeta works by running a small, proven correct monitor in a trusted execution environment validating responses from the service. The key idea is that we only need to develop the monitor using proof-oriented programming once-and-for-all, while the large legacy service remains untrusted. I will illustrate Zeta by sketching an example of how we can make a concurrent, high-performance, key-value store "zero trust" and argue that this step incurs modest software engineering effort and modest runtime overheads.