{"title":"具有双重环境外部性的寡头垄断中的最优企业组合","authors":"Flavio Delbono, L. Lambertini","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2464072","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"We charaterise the socially optimal mix of firms in an oligopoly with both profit-seeking and labour-managed firms. The policy maker faces a twofold externality: (i) production entails the exploitation of a common pool natural resource and (ii) production/consumption pollutes the environment. We study the relationship between firms' mix and social welfare in the Cournot-Nash equilibrium of the industry and the resulting policy implications.","PeriodicalId":412473,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Microeconometric Models of Firm Behavior & the Environment (Topic)","volume":"55 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2014-07-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Optimal Firms’ Mix in Oligopoly with Twofold Environmental Externality\",\"authors\":\"Flavio Delbono, L. Lambertini\",\"doi\":\"10.2139/ssrn.2464072\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"We charaterise the socially optimal mix of firms in an oligopoly with both profit-seeking and labour-managed firms. The policy maker faces a twofold externality: (i) production entails the exploitation of a common pool natural resource and (ii) production/consumption pollutes the environment. We study the relationship between firms' mix and social welfare in the Cournot-Nash equilibrium of the industry and the resulting policy implications.\",\"PeriodicalId\":412473,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"ERN: Microeconometric Models of Firm Behavior & the Environment (Topic)\",\"volume\":\"55 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2014-07-09\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"ERN: Microeconometric Models of Firm Behavior & the Environment (Topic)\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2464072\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"ERN: Microeconometric Models of Firm Behavior & the Environment (Topic)","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2464072","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
Optimal Firms’ Mix in Oligopoly with Twofold Environmental Externality
We charaterise the socially optimal mix of firms in an oligopoly with both profit-seeking and labour-managed firms. The policy maker faces a twofold externality: (i) production entails the exploitation of a common pool natural resource and (ii) production/consumption pollutes the environment. We study the relationship between firms' mix and social welfare in the Cournot-Nash equilibrium of the industry and the resulting policy implications.
京公网安备 11010802042870号
京ICP备2023020795号-1
分享
求助内容：
应助结果提醒方式：
扫码关注我们
