Sümeyra Atmaca, Karolin Kirschenmann, S. Ongena, K. Schoors
{"title":"存款保险、银行所有权与存款人行为","authors":"Sümeyra Atmaca, Karolin Kirschenmann, S. Ongena, K. Schoors","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3766016","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"We employ proprietary data from a large bank to analyze how (in times of crisis) depositors react to a bank nationalization, re-privatization and an accompanying increase in deposit insurance. Nationalization slows depositors fleeing the bank, provided they have sufficient trust in the national government, while the increase in deposit insurance spurs depositors below the new 100K limit to deposit more. Prior to nationalization, depositors bunch just below the then-prevailing 20K limit. But they abandon bunching entirely during state-ownership, to return to bunching below the new 100K limit after re-privatization. Especially depositors with low switching costs are moving money around.","PeriodicalId":443031,"journal":{"name":"Political Economy - Development: Political Institutions eJournal","volume":"51 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2020-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"2","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Deposit Insurance, Bank Ownership and Depositor Behavior\",\"authors\":\"Sümeyra Atmaca, Karolin Kirschenmann, S. Ongena, K. Schoors\",\"doi\":\"10.2139/ssrn.3766016\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"We employ proprietary data from a large bank to analyze how (in times of crisis) depositors react to a bank nationalization, re-privatization and an accompanying increase in deposit insurance. Nationalization slows depositors fleeing the bank, provided they have sufficient trust in the national government, while the increase in deposit insurance spurs depositors below the new 100K limit to deposit more. Prior to nationalization, depositors bunch just below the then-prevailing 20K limit. But they abandon bunching entirely during state-ownership, to return to bunching below the new 100K limit after re-privatization. Especially depositors with low switching costs are moving money around.\",\"PeriodicalId\":443031,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Political Economy - Development: Political Institutions eJournal\",\"volume\":\"51 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2020-12-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"2\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Political Economy - Development: Political Institutions eJournal\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3766016\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Political Economy - Development: Political Institutions eJournal","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3766016","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
Deposit Insurance, Bank Ownership and Depositor Behavior
We employ proprietary data from a large bank to analyze how (in times of crisis) depositors react to a bank nationalization, re-privatization and an accompanying increase in deposit insurance. Nationalization slows depositors fleeing the bank, provided they have sufficient trust in the national government, while the increase in deposit insurance spurs depositors below the new 100K limit to deposit more. Prior to nationalization, depositors bunch just below the then-prevailing 20K limit. But they abandon bunching entirely during state-ownership, to return to bunching below the new 100K limit after re-privatization. Especially depositors with low switching costs are moving money around.