存款保险、银行所有权与存款人行为

Sümeyra Atmaca, Karolin Kirschenmann, S. Ongena, K. Schoors
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引用次数: 2

摘要

我们使用一家大型银行的专有数据来分析(在危机时期)存款人对银行国有化、再私有化以及随之而来的存款保险增加的反应。国有化减缓了储户逃离银行的速度,前提是他们对国家政府有足够的信任,而存款保险的增加则刺激了低于10万新限额的储户增加存款。在国有化之前,存款人的存款额度略低于当时流行的2万。但他们在国有期间完全放弃了集束,在重新私有化后又回到了低于10万的集束。特别是存款成本较低的储户正在转移资金。
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Deposit Insurance, Bank Ownership and Depositor Behavior
We employ proprietary data from a large bank to analyze how (in times of crisis) depositors react to a bank nationalization, re-privatization and an accompanying increase in deposit insurance. Nationalization slows depositors fleeing the bank, provided they have sufficient trust in the national government, while the increase in deposit insurance spurs depositors below the new 100K limit to deposit more. Prior to nationalization, depositors bunch just below the then-prevailing 20K limit. But they abandon bunching entirely during state-ownership, to return to bunching below the new 100K limit after re-privatization. Especially depositors with low switching costs are moving money around.
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