Is There a Role for Domestic Law in the Interpretation of the European Convention on Human Rights?

In the context of the European Convention on Human Rights, the doctrine of autonomous concepts seems to perfectly embody the dogma of the limited relevance of domestic law before international courts, since it postulates that classifications and qualifications in national laws have a relative value and may only constitute a starting point for the Court’s interpretation. Traditionally, domestic law is merely considered as part of the State conduct subject to the Court’s judicial review vis-à-vis conventional obligations. However, the purported independence of autonomous concepts from domestic law is far from absolute in practice, since the process of interpretation of autonomous concepts may contemplate consensus arguments, possibly leading to support or disincentivize autonomous interpretation. The article explores the weaknesses and strengths of this possible approach, which ultimately serves the purpose of avoiding the adoption of autonomous concepts completely detached from national legal systems and preventing criticism of illegitimate judicial law-making.