文学的情感批评:用一种新的情感基调来重塑社会

Yubraj Aryal
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So when we interpret the social, we always need to weigh the underlying affective aesthetic dimension of the social. My use of the term 'aesthetic' here refers to the body and its affective engagement with the world, and 'social' to political, economic and ideological representations. And also, my sense of affective criticism refers to the body, affectivity and affects rather than language, text and emotion. I would first like to begin with my surgery of the social. A common question: What does it mean to 'think' the social? If the social constitutes economic and political practices of a given society and relationship of its members of a particular time, what forces constitute the fundamental substance of such practices and relationships? In other words, what constitute a socialized self (and even cognitive apparatus) in which are made manifest our economic and political practices, as well as the sets of relationships between social members manifest? My answer to these questions is that it is the affects and the affective relations of bodies that constitute the very phenomenon of a social self. The social-the content of subjectivity-is mere a surface effect or a 'symptom' of the affects. Every social representation is a codified affect. As Nietzsche says, \"the relation of representation and power [affect] is so close that all power is represented and every representation is of power.\" (1) The latent content of every social code is affect. If we remove the rubble of the social, we reach out to the bottom of human existence, where aesthetic processes are active in the formation of the socialized self. In an attempt to reread the nature of social, we find its underpinnings in the creativity and affirmation within [human] body. The body is a power house of auto-affects, which impose becoming in social realities and its semiotics, and thus create socialized self. One example for such imposition of auto-affects to social reality, as Foucault refers to, is the constitution of the gay community in San Francisco in the 1980s which was formed, not from the top down (state to society to individual), but from the \"self-affectivity\" of men who constituted themselves as gay, and eventually formed a community and added up new semiotics of sextuality in the very social. The individual group's act of self-affectivity is axiomatized as a social field-self-affectivity, I consider here, as an aesthetic phenomenon. So any attempt to understand a de-aestheticized social is blatantly ignoring the fundamental aesthetic principles in which human bodies work in the production of the social. All the domains of human subjectivity are social to the extent that these \"living organisms, languages and societies are all expressions of particular structure\" (2) of affects our bodies produce. Without this structure, neither the social nor the mental would exist. This understanding of the social breaks from the representationalist account, assuming social phenomenon as the mode of affects (3). This demands to envision a society undivided but works with the complex surface of relations, connections and interactions of one body with other body. 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引用次数: 0

摘要

我在这篇社论中的目的是证明,与詹姆斯的政治阅读不同,只有对文学和社会的情感批评才能广泛地符合社会事实与人类主体性的关系。这样的文学批评用一种新的情感的方式重新诠释了我们对社会的理解,以反驳任何损害社会背后情感的深层审美条件的解读。我认为,社会/政治是情感的表现/“症状”,因此,为了理解文学和社会的任何社会现象或“政治无意识”,将情感纳入讨论是必不可少的。我认为每个社会都已经是一个审美化了的社会。没有一种社会是不受审美制约的。所以我们在解读社会时,总是需要权衡社会潜在的情感审美维度。我在这里使用的术语“美学”指的是身体及其与世界的情感接触,而“社会”指的是政治、经济和意识形态的表现。而且,我的情感批评指的是身体、情感和影响,而不是语言、文本和情感。首先,我想从我的社会手术开始。一个常见的问题是:“思考”社会是什么意思?如果社会构成了一个特定社会的经济和政治实践及其成员在特定时期的关系,那么什么力量构成了这些实践和关系的基本实质?换句话说,是什么构成了一个社会化的自我(甚至是认知机制),在这个自我中,我们的经济和政治实践以及社会成员之间的一系列关系得以体现?我对这些问题的回答是,正是身体的情感和情感关系构成了社会自我的现象。社会——主体性的内容——仅仅是表象的效果,或者是表象的症状。每一种社会表征都是一种成文的情感。正如尼采所说,“表征和权力(影响)的关系是如此紧密,以至于所有的权力都被表征,而每一种表征都是权力。”(1)每一种社会规范的潜在内容都是情感。如果我们清除社会的瓦砾,我们就能触及人类存在的底层,在那里,审美过程在社会化自我的形成中是活跃的。在重新解读社会本质的尝试中,我们发现它的基础是[人类]体内的创造力和肯定。身体是一个自我影响的动力室,它在社会现实及其符号学中强加了“成为”,从而创造了社会化的自我。福柯所提到的,将自我影响强加于社会现实的一个例子,是20世纪80年代旧金山同性恋社区的构成,它不是由自上而下(国家到社会到个人)形成的,而是由那些把自己定义为同性恋的人的“自我情感”形成的,最终形成了一个社区,并在社会中增加了新的性符号学。个体群体的自我情感行为被公理化为一种社会场域——我在这里认为自我情感是一种审美现象。因此,任何试图理解一个去审美化的社会的尝试,都是公然忽视了人体在社会生产中工作的基本美学原则。人类主体性的所有领域都是社会性的,因为这些“活的有机体、语言和社会都是我们身体产生的特定结构的表达”(2)。没有这种结构,社会和精神都将不复存在。这种对社会的理解打破了表征主义的解释,假设社会现象是影响的模式(3)。这要求我们设想一个完整的社会,但在一个身体与另一个身体的关系、联系和互动的复杂表面上工作。每一个社会主体都不仅仅是一个单位,而是一种情感模式。…
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Affective Criticism of Literature: Recasting Social in a New Key of Affects
My aim in this editorial is to prove that only an affective criticism of literature and society, unlike the Jamesonian political reading, can broadly correspond to social facts' relation to the human subjectivity. And such criticism of literature recasts our interpretation of the social in a new key of affects in order to confute any readings that impair the deep aesthetic conditions of affect underneath the social. I argue that the social/political is a manifestation/'symptom' of the affects, and therefore, to understand any social phenomena or 'political unconscious' of the literature and society, the incorporation of affect under discussion is imperative. I claim that every social is already an aestheticized social. There is no social which is not aesthetically conditioned. So when we interpret the social, we always need to weigh the underlying affective aesthetic dimension of the social. My use of the term 'aesthetic' here refers to the body and its affective engagement with the world, and 'social' to political, economic and ideological representations. And also, my sense of affective criticism refers to the body, affectivity and affects rather than language, text and emotion. I would first like to begin with my surgery of the social. A common question: What does it mean to 'think' the social? If the social constitutes economic and political practices of a given society and relationship of its members of a particular time, what forces constitute the fundamental substance of such practices and relationships? In other words, what constitute a socialized self (and even cognitive apparatus) in which are made manifest our economic and political practices, as well as the sets of relationships between social members manifest? My answer to these questions is that it is the affects and the affective relations of bodies that constitute the very phenomenon of a social self. The social-the content of subjectivity-is mere a surface effect or a 'symptom' of the affects. Every social representation is a codified affect. As Nietzsche says, "the relation of representation and power [affect] is so close that all power is represented and every representation is of power." (1) The latent content of every social code is affect. If we remove the rubble of the social, we reach out to the bottom of human existence, where aesthetic processes are active in the formation of the socialized self. In an attempt to reread the nature of social, we find its underpinnings in the creativity and affirmation within [human] body. The body is a power house of auto-affects, which impose becoming in social realities and its semiotics, and thus create socialized self. One example for such imposition of auto-affects to social reality, as Foucault refers to, is the constitution of the gay community in San Francisco in the 1980s which was formed, not from the top down (state to society to individual), but from the "self-affectivity" of men who constituted themselves as gay, and eventually formed a community and added up new semiotics of sextuality in the very social. The individual group's act of self-affectivity is axiomatized as a social field-self-affectivity, I consider here, as an aesthetic phenomenon. So any attempt to understand a de-aestheticized social is blatantly ignoring the fundamental aesthetic principles in which human bodies work in the production of the social. All the domains of human subjectivity are social to the extent that these "living organisms, languages and societies are all expressions of particular structure" (2) of affects our bodies produce. Without this structure, neither the social nor the mental would exist. This understanding of the social breaks from the representationalist account, assuming social phenomenon as the mode of affects (3). This demands to envision a society undivided but works with the complex surface of relations, connections and interactions of one body with other body. Each of this social body is not just a unit but a mode of affects. …
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