忆阻器计算系统安全技术综述

Minhui Zou, Nan Du, Shahar Kvatinsky
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引用次数: 3

摘要

神经网络(NN)算法已经成为视觉对象识别、自然语言处理和机器人技术的主要工具。为了提高这些算法的计算效率,与传统的冯·诺伊曼计算体系结构相比,研究人员一直关注于忆阻器计算系统。今天使用忆阻器计算系统的一个主要缺点是,在人工智能(AI)时代,训练有素的神经网络模型是知识产权,当加载到忆阻器计算系统中时,会面临盗窃威胁,尤其是在边缘设备中运行时。对手可能会通过学习攻击和侧信道分析等高级攻击窃取训练有素的神经网络模型。在本文中,我们回顾了保护忆阻器计算系统的不同安全技术。基于对对手能力的假设,描述了两种威胁模型:黑盒(BB)模型和白盒(WB)模型。在这些威胁模型的背景下,我们将现有的安全技术分为五类:阻止学习攻击(BB),阻止侧信道攻击(BB),神经网络模型加密(WB),神经网络权重转换(WB)和指纹嵌入(WB)。我们还对安全技术的局限性进行了交叉比较。本文可为安全忆阻计算系统的设计提供参考。
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Review of security techniques for memristor computing systems
Neural network (NN) algorithms have become the dominant tool in visual object recognition, natural language processing, and robotics. To enhance the computational efficiency of these algorithms, in comparison to the traditional von Neuman computing architectures, researchers have been focusing on memristor computing systems. A major drawback when using memristor computing systems today is that, in the artificial intelligence (AI) era, well-trained NN models are intellectual property and, when loaded in the memristor computing systems, face theft threats, especially when running in edge devices. An adversary may steal the well-trained NN models through advanced attacks such as learning attacks and side-channel analysis. In this paper, we review different security techniques for protecting memristor computing systems. Two threat models are described based on their assumptions regarding the adversary’s capabilities: a black-box (BB) model and a white-box (WB) model. We categorize the existing security techniques into five classes in the context of these threat models: thwarting learning attacks (BB), thwarting side-channel attacks (BB), NN model encryption (WB), NN weight transformation (WB), and fingerprint embedding (WB). We also present a cross-comparison of the limitations of the security techniques. This paper could serve as an aid when designing secure memristor computing systems.
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