作为隐性态度的智力恶习

A. Besedin
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摘要

本文分析了当代美德认识论的一个重要概念——知识分子罪恶的概念,这是一种阻碍负责任研究的知识分子品格特征。本文的目的是提出一个假设,即今天,在现代文化中,认知上的恶习有很大一部分是隐性的态度。文章的第一部分探讨了内隐态度的概念,考察了在研究文献中广泛存在的内隐态度的例子:内隐性别歧视和种族主义。文章的第二部分表明,在隐性偏见的情况下,存在着认知缺陷的表现,而基于扎格布斯基思想的“动机”理论不能解释隐性偏见情况下智力缺陷的表现。在文章的第三部分中,我们证明了内隐态度可以是行为人性格的特征(就像主体自己没有意识到的道德恶习一样):它们可以获得,根植于人格,并且可以纠正。文章的第四段分析了在哪些条件下,智力的恶习可以是明确的态度。如果行为人是一个恶魔般的存在(以邪恶为目标),有自私的恶习(对自己和他人采用不同的恶习标准),或者是非理性的,这是可能的。在最后一节,它显示了批判性思维在现代社会的传播应该导致从显性态度到隐性态度的智力恶习的转变。最后,对这一假设的理论意义和现实意义进行了总结。从理论的角度来看,它使我们能够解释为什么智力上的恶习普遍存在且难以根除,将恶习作为性格特征置于地方(情境)和全球层面之间,将所有关于内隐态度的研究应用于认知恶习的概念,发展出一种认知责任理论。实际上,这一假设可以用来分析隐性恶习在各个领域的表现。
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Intellectual Vices as Implicit Attitudes
The article analyzes an important concept of contemporary virtue epistemology – the concept of intellectual vice, that is a trait of intellectual character that hinders responsible research. The purpose of this article is to formulate a hypothesis that, today, in the modern culture, a significant part of epistemic vices are implicit attitudes. The first part of the article explores the concept of implicit attitude, examines examples of implicit attitudes that have become widespread in the research literature: implicit sexism and racism. The second part of the article shows that in cases of implicitly biased behavior there is a manifestation of epistemic vice, and that the “motivational” theory based on Zagzebski’s ideas cannot explain the manifestation of intellectual vice in cases of implicit bias. In the third section of the article, it is demonstrated that implicit attitudes can be traits of the agent’s character (like moral vices that are not recognized by the subject herself): they can be acquired, rooted in the personality, and can be corrected. The fourth paragraph of the article analyses the conditions under which intellectual vices can be explicit attitudes. It is possible if the agent is a diabolical being (guided by evil as a goal), has egoistic vices (applies different criteria of vice to himself and to others), or is irrational. In the final section, it is shown that the spread of critical thinking in modern society should lead to the transition of intellectual vices from explicit attitudes to implicit ones. The conclusion is made about the theoretical and practical significance of the hypothesis under discussion. From a theoretical point of view, it allows us to explain why intellectual vices are widespread and difficult to eradicate, to place vices as character traits between the local (situational) and global levels, to apply to the concept of epistemic vice all the research concerning implicit attitudes, to develop a theory of epistemic responsibility. In practical terms, this hypothesis can be used to analyze the manifestations of implicit vices in various spheres.
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