影响:超越文化的思考身份

Yubraj Aryal
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And we have already produced numerous theoretical models to approach culture, politics and history, and their effectivity over the formation of subjectivity as effects of narrative seeing history \"... as a kind of production of various kinds of narratives.\" (2) But here I am attempting to approach subjectivity from the idea of 'noncultural'/'nonnarrated' reality of affects, neither taking any airy transcendentalist turn nor adopting the point of view of any \"misty crust\" of cultural universalism, but rather from the position of Spinozian ethics of immanence. (3) My sense of 'noncultural' does not deny culture rather expands its horizon opening new fields for [cultural] individuations; rather helps to analyze the content and expression of culture. Additionally, I am also trying to introduce Spinozian view point of affects as a can-be new approach to analyze postcolonial/transnational bodies of literature. What is wrong with the representationalist account of cultural individuations? How can my alternative model of [cultural] identities save an idealistic/humanistic mission for society? These are the two major questions I am intending to address. To start with the first question, I disagree with the idea that who am I is based on in which ethnicity, in which nationality, in which political, religious, ethical systems I grew up. I am not a representation of the summations of these social and geographical abstractions, nor am I the effects of narratives under certain \"regimes of power.\" I am a \"pure, pre-extensive spatium in intelligible extension.\" (4) My intelligible extension is grounded in the real world where I encounter not the \"clear and distinct\" ideas or causations and effects of some conceptual abstractions that we call narratives of history, ideology, politics and truth but physical affects and affections (5) that my body produces with another body. And my intelligibility of the world cannot be adequately mediated either through any conceptual abstraction. I am my affective investment to the world. In other words, the content of my identity is not the idea of some conceptual abstractions, but rather the expressive power of my body. My body is an immanent force, which encounters other forces in the world and shapes what is in me and possibly cause to shape what is in others. I am a force, a new emergence within me all the time. That emergence is a purely organic process: an appreciative activity and organic vitality and it is affirmative will-to-create new individuations. I am not like \"deorganizing the organic\" (6) in any ossified representations. I am neither deorganic representation of any abstract stratifications that people name \"culture,\" \"history,\" etc., nor am I effects of discursive formation, as Foucault for instance thinks . I am the organic body not a de-organic formation of effects of some social production. Body is generative organism which creates affects and affections, which, even culturalist like Marcus admits, are structured around our social institutions. Body is not irreducible to any external disciplinary practices as Foucault maintains when he says: \"True discourse, liberated by the nature of its form from desire and power, is incapable of recognising the will to truth which pervades it; and the will to truth, having imposed itself upon us [body] for so long, is such that the truth it seeks to reveal cannot fail to mask it.\" (7) For Foucault, my body is acted upon, and some external abstraction which he calls \"discourse\" acts. This is just Foucault in his later works does not believe, a point that supports my claim here. My body acts upon other bodies. 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What is wrong with the representationalist account of cultural individuations? How can my alternative model of [cultural] identities save an idealistic/humanistic mission for society? These are the two major questions I am intending to address. To start with the first question, I disagree with the idea that who am I is based on in which ethnicity, in which nationality, in which political, religious, ethical systems I grew up. I am not a representation of the summations of these social and geographical abstractions, nor am I the effects of narratives under certain \\\"regimes of power.\\\" I am a \\\"pure, pre-extensive spatium in intelligible extension.\\\" (4) My intelligible extension is grounded in the real world where I encounter not the \\\"clear and distinct\\\" ideas or causations and effects of some conceptual abstractions that we call narratives of history, ideology, politics and truth but physical affects and affections (5) that my body produces with another body. And my intelligibility of the world cannot be adequately mediated either through any conceptual abstraction. I am my affective investment to the world. In other words, the content of my identity is not the idea of some conceptual abstractions, but rather the expressive power of my body. My body is an immanent force, which encounters other forces in the world and shapes what is in me and possibly cause to shape what is in others. I am a force, a new emergence within me all the time. That emergence is a purely organic process: an appreciative activity and organic vitality and it is affirmative will-to-create new individuations. I am not like \\\"deorganizing the organic\\\" (6) in any ossified representations. I am neither deorganic representation of any abstract stratifications that people name \\\"culture,\\\" \\\"history,\\\" etc., nor am I effects of discursive formation, as Foucault for instance thinks . 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引用次数: 0

摘要

我在这篇社论中的目的是提出一种身份的替代模型,以反对文化主义者对身份的解释,试图通过求助于情感的概念来(重新)思考[文化]身份的概念。(1)在文化主义者的解释中,身份通常是根据种族、阶级和性别来定义的。我们已经产生了许多理论模型来研究文化、政治和历史,以及它们对主体性形成的有效性,作为叙事看待历史的效果……作为一种各种叙事的产物"(2)但在这里,我试图从“非文化的”/“非叙述的”情感现实的观念来接近主体性,既不采取任何空想的先验主义的转向,也不采取任何文化普遍主义的“朦胧外壳”的观点,而是从斯宾诺莎的内在伦理学的立场出发。(3)我对“非文化”的理解并没有否定文化,而是扩大了文化的视野,为(文化)个体化开辟了新的领域;而是有助于分析文化的内容和表达。此外,我还试图介绍斯宾诺莎的情感观点,作为一种分析后殖民/跨国文学体的新方法。表征主义对文化个体化的解释错在哪里?我的另一种[文化]身份模型如何能为社会拯救理想主义/人文主义使命?这是我要谈的两个主要问题。从第一个问题开始,我不同意我是谁是基于我在哪个种族,哪个国籍,哪个政治,宗教,道德体系中长大的观点。我不是这些社会和地理抽象的总和的代表,也不是某些“权力制度”下叙事的影响。我是一个“在可理解的延伸中纯粹的、前扩展的空间”。(4)我的可理解延伸是建立在现实世界的基础上的,在那里我遇到的不是“清晰而清晰”的想法,也不是我们称之为历史、意识形态、政治和真理叙事的一些概念性抽象的因果关系,而是我的身体与另一个身体产生的身体影响和情感。我对世界的可解性既不能通过任何概念抽象来充分中介。我是我对世界的情感投资。换句话说,我身份的内容不是一些概念抽象的想法,而是我身体的表达能力。我的身体是一种内在的力量,它与世界上的其他力量相遇,塑造了我的身体,也可能塑造了别人的身体。我是一种力量,一种每时每刻都在我内心出现的新生力量。这种涌现是一种纯粹的有机过程:一种欣赏活动和有机活力,是创造新个性的肯定意志。我不喜欢在任何僵化的表述中“解构有机”(6)。我既不是人们称之为“文化”、“历史”等抽象分层的非有机表现,也不是话语形成的结果,比如福柯认为。我是一个有机的身体,而不是某种社会生产的非有机产物。身体是能产生情感和情感的生殖有机体,即使像马库斯这样的文化主义者也承认,这些情感和情感是围绕我们的社会制度构建的。身体并非无法还原为任何外部纪律实践,正如福柯所坚持的那样,他说:“真正的话语,被其形式的本质从欲望和权力中解放出来,无法识别弥漫其中的真理意志;而追求真理的意志,长期以来一直强加在我们身上,它所要揭示的真理必然会掩盖它。”(7)对福柯来说,我的身体是被作用的,是某种外在的抽象,他称之为“话语”的作用。这是福柯在他后来的作品中不相信的,这一点支持了我的观点。我的身体作用于其他身体。在它对世界的积极投入中,它与其他物体或构成或分解关系。…
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Affects: Thinking Identities beyond Culture
My aim in this editorial is to propose an alternative model of identities in opposition to the culturalist account of identities in an attempt to (re) think notions of [cultural] identities through recourse to the idea of affects. (1) In a culturalist account, identities are often defined in terms of race, class and gender. And we have already produced numerous theoretical models to approach culture, politics and history, and their effectivity over the formation of subjectivity as effects of narrative seeing history "... as a kind of production of various kinds of narratives." (2) But here I am attempting to approach subjectivity from the idea of 'noncultural'/'nonnarrated' reality of affects, neither taking any airy transcendentalist turn nor adopting the point of view of any "misty crust" of cultural universalism, but rather from the position of Spinozian ethics of immanence. (3) My sense of 'noncultural' does not deny culture rather expands its horizon opening new fields for [cultural] individuations; rather helps to analyze the content and expression of culture. Additionally, I am also trying to introduce Spinozian view point of affects as a can-be new approach to analyze postcolonial/transnational bodies of literature. What is wrong with the representationalist account of cultural individuations? How can my alternative model of [cultural] identities save an idealistic/humanistic mission for society? These are the two major questions I am intending to address. To start with the first question, I disagree with the idea that who am I is based on in which ethnicity, in which nationality, in which political, religious, ethical systems I grew up. I am not a representation of the summations of these social and geographical abstractions, nor am I the effects of narratives under certain "regimes of power." I am a "pure, pre-extensive spatium in intelligible extension." (4) My intelligible extension is grounded in the real world where I encounter not the "clear and distinct" ideas or causations and effects of some conceptual abstractions that we call narratives of history, ideology, politics and truth but physical affects and affections (5) that my body produces with another body. And my intelligibility of the world cannot be adequately mediated either through any conceptual abstraction. I am my affective investment to the world. In other words, the content of my identity is not the idea of some conceptual abstractions, but rather the expressive power of my body. My body is an immanent force, which encounters other forces in the world and shapes what is in me and possibly cause to shape what is in others. I am a force, a new emergence within me all the time. That emergence is a purely organic process: an appreciative activity and organic vitality and it is affirmative will-to-create new individuations. I am not like "deorganizing the organic" (6) in any ossified representations. I am neither deorganic representation of any abstract stratifications that people name "culture," "history," etc., nor am I effects of discursive formation, as Foucault for instance thinks . I am the organic body not a de-organic formation of effects of some social production. Body is generative organism which creates affects and affections, which, even culturalist like Marcus admits, are structured around our social institutions. Body is not irreducible to any external disciplinary practices as Foucault maintains when he says: "True discourse, liberated by the nature of its form from desire and power, is incapable of recognising the will to truth which pervades it; and the will to truth, having imposed itself upon us [body] for so long, is such that the truth it seeks to reveal cannot fail to mask it." (7) For Foucault, my body is acted upon, and some external abstraction which he calls "discourse" acts. This is just Foucault in his later works does not believe, a point that supports my claim here. My body acts upon other bodies. In its active investment to the world, it either enters into compositional or decompositional relationship with other bodies. …
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