{"title":"坏的重复","authors":"Geoffroy de Clippel, Kareen Rozen","doi":"10.1086/724325","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"While most experimental papers on repeated games explore the benefits of repeated interactions, we explore the often-overlooked potential for negative implications. We demonstrate this possibility in the lab with a standard random-termination protocol applied to a new, simple, and easily interpretable stage game, capturing stylized aspects of bystander complacency.","PeriodicalId":289840,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Political Economy Microeconomics","volume":"21 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2023-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Bad Repetition\",\"authors\":\"Geoffroy de Clippel, Kareen Rozen\",\"doi\":\"10.1086/724325\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"While most experimental papers on repeated games explore the benefits of repeated interactions, we explore the often-overlooked potential for negative implications. We demonstrate this possibility in the lab with a standard random-termination protocol applied to a new, simple, and easily interpretable stage game, capturing stylized aspects of bystander complacency.\",\"PeriodicalId\":289840,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Journal of Political Economy Microeconomics\",\"volume\":\"21 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2023-02-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Journal of Political Economy Microeconomics\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1086/724325\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Journal of Political Economy Microeconomics","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1086/724325","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
While most experimental papers on repeated games explore the benefits of repeated interactions, we explore the often-overlooked potential for negative implications. We demonstrate this possibility in the lab with a standard random-termination protocol applied to a new, simple, and easily interpretable stage game, capturing stylized aspects of bystander complacency.
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