Michel André Maréchal, Alain Cohn, Jeffrey Yusof, Ray Fisman
{"title":"Whose Preferences Matter for Redistribution: Cross-Country Evidence","authors":"Michel André Maréchal, Alain Cohn, Jeffrey Yusof, Ray Fisman","doi":"10.1086/732238","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1086/732238","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":289840,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Political Economy Microeconomics","volume":"10 4","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-07-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141642163","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Fairness Gaps for Earnings Tax Design","authors":"Erwin Ooghe, Erik Schokkaert, Hannes Serruys","doi":"10.1086/732240","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1086/732240","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":289840,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Political Economy Microeconomics","volume":"5 5","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-07-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141641418","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Cultural Assimilation and Nation Building","authors":"Chanelle Duley, Prasanna Gai","doi":"10.1086/732244","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1086/732244","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":289840,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Political Economy Microeconomics","volume":"67 19","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-07-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141643156","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
I study limited price discrimination based on search costs. "Shoppers" have a zero and "nonshoppers" a positive search cost. A consumer faces a nondiscriminatory "common" price with some probability, or a discriminatory price. In equilibrium, firms mix over the common and the shoppers' discriminatory prices, but set a singleton nonshoppers' discriminatory price. Less likely price discrimination mostly benefits consumers. An individual firm's profit can increase in the number of firms. These results have important implications for regulations that limit price discrimination via reduced tracking (e.g., EU's GDPR, California's CCPA) and for evaluating competition online based on the number of firms.
{"title":"Search and Price Discrimination Online","authors":"E. Mauring","doi":"10.1086/732242","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1086/732242","url":null,"abstract":"I study limited price discrimination based on search costs. \"Shoppers\" have a zero and \"nonshoppers\" a positive search cost. A consumer faces a nondiscriminatory \"common\" price with some probability, or a discriminatory price. In equilibrium, firms mix over the common and the shoppers' discriminatory prices, but set a singleton nonshoppers' discriminatory price. Less likely price discrimination mostly benefits consumers. An individual firm's profit can increase in the number of firms. These results have important implications for regulations that limit price discrimination via reduced tracking (e.g., EU's GDPR, California's CCPA) and for evaluating competition online based on the number of firms.","PeriodicalId":289840,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Political Economy Microeconomics","volume":"8 16","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-07-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141640435","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper studies both donor and nonprofit responses to the star rating system designed by Charity Navigator. Using IRS Form 990 data from 2002 to 2019, I find that an increase in a charity’s rating from 3to the highest 4-star rating is associated with a 6% rise in contributions, with larger effects among smaller charities. Some charities respond to the incentives by changing their behavior to try to get themselves above the star thresholds, leading to “bunching” at the thresholds. This response is equal to the effect of charities halving spending on administration. I find that some of the response is due to misreporting of expenses in order to achieve a higher star rating. The analysis suggests that a notched rating system induces greater behavioral change than a continuous measure, but affects a smaller number of charities. Which rating system is preferred depends on the relative value placed on these effects. ∗Email: jenmayo@umich.edu. I am grateful for advice from Ashley Craig, Jim Hines, Nirupama Rao and Joel Slemrod, and for comments from Charlie Brown, Adam Cole, Vera Eichenauer, Edward Fox, Teresa Harrison, Stephanie Karol, Laura Kawano, Paul Kindsgrab, Shawn Martin, Jonathan Meer, Dylan Moore, Michael Murto, Andrew Simon, as well as seminar participants at the University of Michigan, WZB Berlin, the Online Public Finance Seminar, the 76th Annual Congress of the IIPF, and the NTA Annual Conference 2020.
{"title":"Navigating the Notches: Charity Responses to Ratings","authors":"Jennifer Mayo","doi":"10.1086/732241","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1086/732241","url":null,"abstract":"This paper studies both donor and nonprofit responses to the star rating system designed by Charity Navigator. Using IRS Form 990 data from 2002 to 2019, I find that an increase in a charity’s rating from 3to the highest 4-star rating is associated with a 6% rise in contributions, with larger effects among smaller charities. Some charities respond to the incentives by changing their behavior to try to get themselves above the star thresholds, leading to “bunching” at the thresholds. This response is equal to the effect of charities halving spending on administration. I find that some of the response is due to misreporting of expenses in order to achieve a higher star rating. The analysis suggests that a notched rating system induces greater behavioral change than a continuous measure, but affects a smaller number of charities. Which rating system is preferred depends on the relative value placed on these effects. ∗Email: jenmayo@umich.edu. I am grateful for advice from Ashley Craig, Jim Hines, Nirupama Rao and Joel Slemrod, and for comments from Charlie Brown, Adam Cole, Vera Eichenauer, Edward Fox, Teresa Harrison, Stephanie Karol, Laura Kawano, Paul Kindsgrab, Shawn Martin, Jonathan Meer, Dylan Moore, Michael Murto, Andrew Simon, as well as seminar participants at the University of Michigan, WZB Berlin, the Online Public Finance Seminar, the 76th Annual Congress of the IIPF, and the NTA Annual Conference 2020.","PeriodicalId":289840,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Political Economy Microeconomics","volume":"17 3","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-07-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141641488","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Michèle Belot, Noemi Berlin, Jonathan James, Valeria Skafida
{"title":"Changing Dietary Habits Early in Life: A Field Experiment with Low-Income Families","authors":"Michèle Belot, Noemi Berlin, Jonathan James, Valeria Skafida","doi":"10.1086/732126","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1086/732126","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":289840,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Political Economy Microeconomics","volume":"125 3","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-07-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141665236","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Models of rational inattention allow agents to make mistakes in their actions while assuming they do not make mistakes in attention allocation. I test this assumption by comparing attention’s marginal benefit (better actions) and marginal cost (less time for future decisions) using millions of online chess moves. I cannot reject that skilled players equalize marginal benefit and marginal cost across different time controls. Bad players, when they have little time, under-adjust their attention allocation, leading them to have higher marginal cost. A simple intervention improves players' attention allocation.
{"title":"A Check for Rational Inattention","authors":"Greg Howard","doi":"10.1086/727556","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1086/727556","url":null,"abstract":"Models of rational inattention allow agents to make mistakes in their actions while assuming they do not make mistakes in attention allocation. I test this assumption by comparing attention’s marginal benefit (better actions) and marginal cost (less time for future decisions) using millions of online chess moves. I cannot reject that skilled players equalize marginal benefit and marginal cost across different time controls. Bad players, when they have little time, under-adjust their attention allocation, leading them to have higher marginal cost. A simple intervention improves players' attention allocation.","PeriodicalId":289840,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Political Economy Microeconomics","volume":"21 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126234623","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In the 1996 farm bill, the House of Representatives passed a bill reducing government protections for farmers by 2000. Before its implementation in 1999, the chamber passed a bill reversing these changes. We test the hypothesis that the reversal occurred because of changes in the allocation of campaign contributions from farmers, competing processors, and grocers. To estimate causal effects, we employ a legislator fixed effect logit model. The findings support the hypothesis that the strategic allocation of funds by special interests caused the legislative body to reverse its 1996 vote.
{"title":"Effect of Campaign Contributions on Legislator Behavior: Intra Dairy Industry Interest Group Competition","authors":"K. Dwyer, Thomas Stratmann","doi":"10.1086/726845","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1086/726845","url":null,"abstract":"In the 1996 farm bill, the House of Representatives passed a bill reducing government protections for farmers by 2000. Before its implementation in 1999, the chamber passed a bill reversing these changes. We test the hypothesis that the reversal occurred because of changes in the allocation of campaign contributions from farmers, competing processors, and grocers. To estimate causal effects, we employ a legislator fixed effect logit model. The findings support the hypothesis that the strategic allocation of funds by special interests caused the legislative body to reverse its 1996 vote.","PeriodicalId":289840,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Political Economy Microeconomics","volume":"70 6 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-07-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128684016","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Although many centralized school assignment systems use the strategically simple deferred-acceptance mechanism, applicants often make dominated choices. Using administrative data from Hungary, we show that 11% of college applicants forgo the free opportunity to receive a tuition waiver. Between 12.3% and 18.7% of these dominated choices are consequential, costing 6,600 dollars on average. Our results suggest that dominated choices are more common when their expected utility cost is lower. Since tuition waivers are highly demanded, dominated choices increase the total number applicants assigned to college.
{"title":"Dominated Choices in a Strategically Simple College Admissions Environment","authors":"Ran I. Shorrer, S. Sóvágó","doi":"10.1086/726226","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1086/726226","url":null,"abstract":"Although many centralized school assignment systems use the strategically simple deferred-acceptance mechanism, applicants often make dominated choices. Using administrative data from Hungary, we show that 11% of college applicants forgo the free opportunity to receive a tuition waiver. Between 12.3% and 18.7% of these dominated choices are consequential, costing 6,600 dollars on average. Our results suggest that dominated choices are more common when their expected utility cost is lower. Since tuition waivers are highly demanded, dominated choices increase the total number applicants assigned to college.","PeriodicalId":289840,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Political Economy Microeconomics","volume":"33 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-07-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127742974","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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