{"title":"银行公司:抵押品信号的作用","authors":"V. Bieta, Udo Broll, Wilfried Siebe","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1135680","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"In this paper we challenge basic results of signaling models. In our banking model each project of a borrower is described by a continuous density of outcomes. Different density functions are classified according to second stochastisch dominance. Combining these features we find that in a banking model collateral is no longer in a position to signal the degree of riskiness of the borrower to the lender. In most cases the equilibrium is a pooling equilibrium.","PeriodicalId":149679,"journal":{"name":"Frontiers in Finance & Economics","volume":"81 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2008-03-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"11","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"The Banking Firm: The Role of Signaling with Collaterals\",\"authors\":\"V. Bieta, Udo Broll, Wilfried Siebe\",\"doi\":\"10.2139/ssrn.1135680\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"In this paper we challenge basic results of signaling models. In our banking model each project of a borrower is described by a continuous density of outcomes. Different density functions are classified according to second stochastisch dominance. Combining these features we find that in a banking model collateral is no longer in a position to signal the degree of riskiness of the borrower to the lender. In most cases the equilibrium is a pooling equilibrium.\",\"PeriodicalId\":149679,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Frontiers in Finance & Economics\",\"volume\":\"81 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2008-03-08\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"11\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Frontiers in Finance & Economics\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1135680\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Frontiers in Finance & Economics","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1135680","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
The Banking Firm: The Role of Signaling with Collaterals
In this paper we challenge basic results of signaling models. In our banking model each project of a borrower is described by a continuous density of outcomes. Different density functions are classified according to second stochastisch dominance. Combining these features we find that in a banking model collateral is no longer in a position to signal the degree of riskiness of the borrower to the lender. In most cases the equilibrium is a pooling equilibrium.
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