{"title":"在不公正的同时对正义的思考","authors":"Alison M. Jaggar","doi":"10.5206/FPQ/2019.2.7283","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Many philosophers endorse the ideal of justice yet disagree radically over what that ideal requires. One persistent problem for thinking about justice is that the unjust social arrangements that originally motivated our questions may also distort our thinking about possible answers. This paper suggests some strategies for improving our thinking about justice in the unjust meantime. As our world becomes more just, we may expect our thinking about justice to improve. \n ","PeriodicalId":387473,"journal":{"name":"Feminist Philosophy Quarterly","volume":"51 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2019-07-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"3","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Thinking about Justice in the Unjust Meantime\",\"authors\":\"Alison M. Jaggar\",\"doi\":\"10.5206/FPQ/2019.2.7283\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"Many philosophers endorse the ideal of justice yet disagree radically over what that ideal requires. One persistent problem for thinking about justice is that the unjust social arrangements that originally motivated our questions may also distort our thinking about possible answers. This paper suggests some strategies for improving our thinking about justice in the unjust meantime. As our world becomes more just, we may expect our thinking about justice to improve. \\n \",\"PeriodicalId\":387473,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Feminist Philosophy Quarterly\",\"volume\":\"51 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2019-07-25\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"3\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Feminist Philosophy Quarterly\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.5206/FPQ/2019.2.7283\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Feminist Philosophy Quarterly","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.5206/FPQ/2019.2.7283","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
Many philosophers endorse the ideal of justice yet disagree radically over what that ideal requires. One persistent problem for thinking about justice is that the unjust social arrangements that originally motivated our questions may also distort our thinking about possible answers. This paper suggests some strategies for improving our thinking about justice in the unjust meantime. As our world becomes more just, we may expect our thinking about justice to improve.
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