{"title":"非对称寡头垄断的微分博弈模型中的贸易收益","authors":"K. Fujiwara","doi":"10.1111/j.1467-9396.2008.00787.x","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"This paper revisits a classical topic of trade gains in a differential game model of oligopoly in which Home and Foreign firms differ in the number and cost. After deriving the feedback Nash equilibrium, we provide examples to consider how the difference in the number of firms or costs affects gainfulness of trade. We prove that feedback strategies can result in implications for trade gains which are sharply different from the open-loop case.","PeriodicalId":351939,"journal":{"name":"Wiley-Blackwell: Review of International Economics","volume":"53 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2009-10-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"3","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Gains from Trade in a Differential Game Model of Asymmetric Oligopoly\",\"authors\":\"K. Fujiwara\",\"doi\":\"10.1111/j.1467-9396.2008.00787.x\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"This paper revisits a classical topic of trade gains in a differential game model of oligopoly in which Home and Foreign firms differ in the number and cost. After deriving the feedback Nash equilibrium, we provide examples to consider how the difference in the number of firms or costs affects gainfulness of trade. We prove that feedback strategies can result in implications for trade gains which are sharply different from the open-loop case.\",\"PeriodicalId\":351939,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Wiley-Blackwell: Review of International Economics\",\"volume\":\"53 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2009-10-28\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"3\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Wiley-Blackwell: Review of International Economics\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9396.2008.00787.x\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Wiley-Blackwell: Review of International Economics","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9396.2008.00787.x","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
Gains from Trade in a Differential Game Model of Asymmetric Oligopoly
This paper revisits a classical topic of trade gains in a differential game model of oligopoly in which Home and Foreign firms differ in the number and cost. After deriving the feedback Nash equilibrium, we provide examples to consider how the difference in the number of firms or costs affects gainfulness of trade. We prove that feedback strategies can result in implications for trade gains which are sharply different from the open-loop case.
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