火警疲劳:政客如何逃避责任

R. Gulotty, Zhaotian Luo
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引用次数: 2

摘要

人们普遍期望独立、客观的监督机构、国会委员会和新闻媒体能够帮助问责政客。我们开发了一个模型,在这个模型中,一个知情的监督机构可以警告公民现任官员的不当行为。与关于谨慎的好处的传统逻辑相匹配,高证据标准是警告具有说服力的必要条件。然而,如果我们考虑到监管质量的不确定性,谨慎和有效性之间的直接联系就会破裂。即使出现“假新闻”的可能性很小,谨慎也可能适得其反,因为在任者会战略性地操纵监督机构的声誉,破坏有效的监督。
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Fire Alarm Fatigue: How Politicians Evade Accountability
Independent and objective oversight bodies, congressional committees and the news media, are widely expected to help hold politicians accountable. We develop a model in which an informed oversight body may warn citizens about misconduct by an incumbent. Matching conventional logic about the benefits of caution, high evidentiary standards are necessary for warnings to be persuasive. However, the straightforward connection between caution and efficacy breaks down if we allow for uncertainty about the quality of oversight. With even a small chance of "fake news", caution can backfire, as incumbents strategically manipulate the reputation of the oversight body to destroy effective oversight.
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