{"title":"针对精确时间协议攻击的检测模型","authors":"Waleed Alghamd, M. Schukat","doi":"10.1109/ICCAIS48893.2020.9096742","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"The IEEE 1588 Precision Time Protocol (PTP) is a widely used mechanism to provide time synchronization of computer clocks down to microsecond accuracy as required by many financial and industrial applications (\"IEEE Standard for a Precision Clock Synchronization Protocol for Networked Measurement and Control Systems,\" 2008). However, PTP is vulnerable to infrastructure cyber-attacks that reduce the desired accuracy. IEEE 1588 defined an experimental security extension (Annex K) in order to protect a PTP network, but various drawbacks have been discovered, resulting in further improvements including the use of public-key encryption ( Itkin & Wool, 2020 ) and reduce the three-way handshake mechanism to one way authentication ( Önal & Kirrmann, 2012 ). Today Annex K is deprecated in favor of L2 / L3 security mechanisms. Further on, in 2020 a backwards compatible IEEE 1588 version (v2.1) will be introduced, that contains a new security extension called Annex S. Annex S consists of four prongs as follows (\"IEEE Draft Standard for a Precision Clock Synchronization Protocol for Networked Measurement and Control Systems,\" 2019): • Prong (A) PTP Integrated Security Mechanism describes an authentication type-length-value (TLV) that is aligned with and integrated into the PTP message. • Prong (B) PTP External Transport Security Mechanisms describes the current external security mechanisms that can be used to provide protection to PTP message i.e., IPsec and MACsec. • Prong (C) Architecture Guidance describes a redundant time system, redundant grandmaster, and redundant paths. • Prong D (Monitoring and Management Guidance) suggests monitoring the slaves’ synchronization process.","PeriodicalId":422184,"journal":{"name":"2020 3rd International Conference on Computer Applications & Information Security (ICCAIS)","volume":"96 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2020-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"9","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"A Detection Model Against Precision Time Protocol Attacks\",\"authors\":\"Waleed Alghamd, M. Schukat\",\"doi\":\"10.1109/ICCAIS48893.2020.9096742\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"The IEEE 1588 Precision Time Protocol (PTP) is a widely used mechanism to provide time synchronization of computer clocks down to microsecond accuracy as required by many financial and industrial applications (\\\"IEEE Standard for a Precision Clock Synchronization Protocol for Networked Measurement and Control Systems,\\\" 2008). However, PTP is vulnerable to infrastructure cyber-attacks that reduce the desired accuracy. IEEE 1588 defined an experimental security extension (Annex K) in order to protect a PTP network, but various drawbacks have been discovered, resulting in further improvements including the use of public-key encryption ( Itkin & Wool, 2020 ) and reduce the three-way handshake mechanism to one way authentication ( Önal & Kirrmann, 2012 ). Today Annex K is deprecated in favor of L2 / L3 security mechanisms. Further on, in 2020 a backwards compatible IEEE 1588 version (v2.1) will be introduced, that contains a new security extension called Annex S. Annex S consists of four prongs as follows (\\\"IEEE Draft Standard for a Precision Clock Synchronization Protocol for Networked Measurement and Control Systems,\\\" 2019): • Prong (A) PTP Integrated Security Mechanism describes an authentication type-length-value (TLV) that is aligned with and integrated into the PTP message. • Prong (B) PTP External Transport Security Mechanisms describes the current external security mechanisms that can be used to provide protection to PTP message i.e., IPsec and MACsec. • Prong (C) Architecture Guidance describes a redundant time system, redundant grandmaster, and redundant paths. • Prong D (Monitoring and Management Guidance) suggests monitoring the slaves’ synchronization process.\",\"PeriodicalId\":422184,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"2020 3rd International Conference on Computer Applications & Information Security (ICCAIS)\",\"volume\":\"96 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2020-03-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"9\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"2020 3rd International Conference on Computer Applications & Information Security (ICCAIS)\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1109/ICCAIS48893.2020.9096742\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"2020 3rd International Conference on Computer Applications & Information Security (ICCAIS)","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1109/ICCAIS48893.2020.9096742","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
A Detection Model Against Precision Time Protocol Attacks
The IEEE 1588 Precision Time Protocol (PTP) is a widely used mechanism to provide time synchronization of computer clocks down to microsecond accuracy as required by many financial and industrial applications ("IEEE Standard for a Precision Clock Synchronization Protocol for Networked Measurement and Control Systems," 2008). However, PTP is vulnerable to infrastructure cyber-attacks that reduce the desired accuracy. IEEE 1588 defined an experimental security extension (Annex K) in order to protect a PTP network, but various drawbacks have been discovered, resulting in further improvements including the use of public-key encryption ( Itkin & Wool, 2020 ) and reduce the three-way handshake mechanism to one way authentication ( Önal & Kirrmann, 2012 ). Today Annex K is deprecated in favor of L2 / L3 security mechanisms. Further on, in 2020 a backwards compatible IEEE 1588 version (v2.1) will be introduced, that contains a new security extension called Annex S. Annex S consists of four prongs as follows ("IEEE Draft Standard for a Precision Clock Synchronization Protocol for Networked Measurement and Control Systems," 2019): • Prong (A) PTP Integrated Security Mechanism describes an authentication type-length-value (TLV) that is aligned with and integrated into the PTP message. • Prong (B) PTP External Transport Security Mechanisms describes the current external security mechanisms that can be used to provide protection to PTP message i.e., IPsec and MACsec. • Prong (C) Architecture Guidance describes a redundant time system, redundant grandmaster, and redundant paths. • Prong D (Monitoring and Management Guidance) suggests monitoring the slaves’ synchronization process.