{"title":"法律与哲学中的强制与意志","authors":"Amit Pundik","doi":"10.1017/cjlj.2018.5","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This paper discusses cases in which defendants were coerced to do something they wanted to do anyway. Through these cases a stark divergence between the legal and philosophical discussion of alternative possibilities is highlighted. The paper seeks to vindicate the legal approach to coercion and volition by showing that the legal approach could be accounted for with an epistemic version of the Principle of Alternative Possibilities, a version which is also immune to Frankfurt-type examples.","PeriodicalId":244583,"journal":{"name":"Canadian Journal of Law & Jurisprudence","volume":"90 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2018-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Coercion and Volition in Law and Philosophy\",\"authors\":\"Amit Pundik\",\"doi\":\"10.1017/cjlj.2018.5\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"Abstract This paper discusses cases in which defendants were coerced to do something they wanted to do anyway. Through these cases a stark divergence between the legal and philosophical discussion of alternative possibilities is highlighted. The paper seeks to vindicate the legal approach to coercion and volition by showing that the legal approach could be accounted for with an epistemic version of the Principle of Alternative Possibilities, a version which is also immune to Frankfurt-type examples.\",\"PeriodicalId\":244583,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Canadian Journal of Law & Jurisprudence\",\"volume\":\"90 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2018-02-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Canadian Journal of Law & Jurisprudence\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1017/cjlj.2018.5\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Canadian Journal of Law & Jurisprudence","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1017/cjlj.2018.5","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract This paper discusses cases in which defendants were coerced to do something they wanted to do anyway. Through these cases a stark divergence between the legal and philosophical discussion of alternative possibilities is highlighted. The paper seeks to vindicate the legal approach to coercion and volition by showing that the legal approach could be accounted for with an epistemic version of the Principle of Alternative Possibilities, a version which is also immune to Frankfurt-type examples.
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