在意识的表面之下还有更多的东西

John G. Taylor
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摘要

亚伦·斯洛曼从非常消极的观点开始他那篇令人振奋的文章:\……意识的概念是如此的糟糕(…),以至于除了说明为什么它在科学语境中毫无价值之外,讨论它没有任何意义,尽管‘有意识’这个形容词在日常谈话和医学语境中有很多用途。”[斯洛曼2009]。这似乎在暗示,他有自己的蛋糕,也吃了它。在生死攸关的问题上(比如确定病人是否处于植物人状态,或者理解精神分裂症患者的经历)使用“意识”是可以的,但在礼貌的科学论述中(至少在亚伦·斯洛曼(Aaron Sloman)在场的时候)就不行。相反,我们必须建立动物(包括人类)所有可能“能力”的模型,然后我们就完成了必要的工作。这些能力不需要有行为结果,也就是说,它们可能是“非行为能力”,斯洛曼说。“非行为能力”究竟是什么并不清楚,因为这篇文章中并没有明确规定,但它似乎包括某种程度的自省或内心报告。斯洛曼声称,如果这样一个建模程序被完全执行……那么人类意识就没有什么需要解释的了。”[斯洛曼2009]。如果将能力的概念扩展到包括从所有可能的来源(fMRI, PET, EEG, MEG,基于多电极的mua和lfp以及同步,大脑活动的因果关系和TMS的影响)获得的脑成像结果,那么我同意这将是所有可能的客观观察结果的集合。与此同时,这些不同状态的受试者的内心报告也必须用来证明他们的合理性。因此,这些无数实验的结果必须精确建模,以便有一个支持各种意识状态的大脑活动的初始基础(前提是在所有可能的意识状态下进行测量:SWS或REM睡眠,当清醒时,根据国际机器意识杂志Vol. 2, No. 1 (2010) 65 68 #.c世界科学出版公司DOI: 10.1142/S1793843010000321
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THERE IS MORE THAN AI BENEATH THE SURFACE OF CONSCIOUSNESS
Aaron Sloman begins his stimulating article from the very negative claim: \... the notion of consciousness is so ill-de ned (...) that there is no point even discussing it except to show why it is worthless in scienti c contexts, though the adjective ‘conscious' has many uses in ordinary conversation and medical contexts." [Sloman, 2009]. So he both has his cake and eats it, this would seem to imply. It is alright to employ \conscious" in matters of life and death (as in determining whether a patient is in a vegetative state or not, or in understanding the experiences of a schizophrenic), but not in polite scienti c discourse (at least when Aaron Sloman is around). Instead we must create models of all possible \competences" of animals (including humans) and then we have done the necessary work. These competences need not have behavioral results, i.e. they could be \non-behavioral competences", according to Sloman. It is not clear exactly what is a \non-behavioral competence", since that is not explicitly de ned in the article, but it seems to include some level of introspection or inner report. Sloman's claim that if such a modeling program is completely carried out \... then there will be nothing left to be explained about human consciousness." [Sloman, 2009]. If the notion of a competence is expanded to also include the results obtained by brain imaging from all possible sources (fMRI, PET, EEG, MEG, multielectrode-based MUAs and LFPs and synchronizations, causal °ows of brain activity and e®ects of TMS) then I would agree that such would be the set of all possible objective observables. At the same time the inner report of subjects in these various states must also be used to justify them. The results of these myriads of experiments must therefore be modeled accurately in order to have a beginning basis of brain activity supporting the various states of consciousness (provided the measurements are taken in all possible states of awareness: SWS or REM sleep, whilst awake, under International Journal of Machine Consciousness Vol. 2, No. 1 (2010) 65 68 #.c World Scienti c Publishing Company DOI: 10.1142/S1793843010000321
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