{"title":"试探性会谈","authors":"Christopher D. Kolenda","doi":"10.5810/kentucky/9780813152769.003.0021","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"This chapter discusses U.S. efforts of reconciliation with the Taliban. Starting in late 2010, U.S. government officials regularly met with Taliban representatives to facilitate confidence-building measures such as detainee exchanges and the opening of a Taliban office in Doha office. Meanwhile, tensions grew between the U.S. government and Karzai, who rejected and felt blind-sided by these talks.","PeriodicalId":235305,"journal":{"name":"Zero-Sum Victory","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2021-10-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Exploratory Talks\",\"authors\":\"Christopher D. Kolenda\",\"doi\":\"10.5810/kentucky/9780813152769.003.0021\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"This chapter discusses U.S. efforts of reconciliation with the Taliban. Starting in late 2010, U.S. government officials regularly met with Taliban representatives to facilitate confidence-building measures such as detainee exchanges and the opening of a Taliban office in Doha office. Meanwhile, tensions grew between the U.S. government and Karzai, who rejected and felt blind-sided by these talks.\",\"PeriodicalId\":235305,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Zero-Sum Victory\",\"volume\":null,\"pages\":null},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2021-10-26\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Zero-Sum Victory\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.5810/kentucky/9780813152769.003.0021\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Zero-Sum Victory","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.5810/kentucky/9780813152769.003.0021","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
This chapter discusses U.S. efforts of reconciliation with the Taliban. Starting in late 2010, U.S. government officials regularly met with Taliban representatives to facilitate confidence-building measures such as detainee exchanges and the opening of a Taliban office in Doha office. Meanwhile, tensions grew between the U.S. government and Karzai, who rejected and felt blind-sided by these talks.