威尔逊政府对布尔什维克俄国立场的演变(1917年11月- 1918年3月)

N. Gorodnia, V. Zatsepilo
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摘要

本文旨在强调威尔逊政府对俄国布尔什维克政府的立场,以及1917年11月(布尔什维克在彼得格勒发动政变)至1918年3月(苏俄与四国同盟签署了单独的布列斯特-里托夫斯克和平条约)期间美国对俄新政策的发展。在1917年11月至1918年2月期间,威尔逊政府对彼得格勒布尔什维克政府的立场仍然不确定。一方面,美国不承认这个政府,即人民委员会,并试图找出俄国反布尔什维克团体推翻它的能力。另一方面,美国政府希望与彼得格勒政府建立非正式的接触与合作,以防止俄国退出战争和东线的崩溃。此外,有必要防止德国人从俄罗斯远东的仓库获得军用物资。为了保护他们,协约国讨论了军事干预的可能性,并鼓励美国参与其中。美国政府拒绝了这种可能性,主要是因为预计俄罗斯人民会对此持负面看法。美国也反对日本的干涉,因为美国认为,日本会打着共同盟国目标的幌子,追求自己在俄罗斯的利益,包括领土扩张。1918年3月初,威尔逊政府对日本干涉的立场发生了明显的变化。伍德罗·威尔逊(Woodrow Wilson)只是在日本显然无论如何都会干预俄罗斯远东地区之后,才撤回了他对日本干预的反对意见。协约国授予日本这种干预的权力,对日本的行动提出了某些要求和限制,这符合俄国的利益。美国立场的转变也是由俄国布尔什维克政府与四国同盟单独签订和约引起的。在那之后,总统表示,美国甚至在事实上都不承认这个政府,因此也不承认它签署的和平条约。然而,尽管威尔逊对布尔什维克政府持消极态度,但他继续将俄罗斯视为盟友,并试图避免做出不符合俄罗斯人民利益的决定。
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Development of the W. Wilson administration’s position on Bolshevik Russia (november 1917 – march 1918)
This article intends to highlight the Wilson administration’s position on the Russian Bolshevik government and the development of a new U.S. policy toward Russia from November 1917, the time of the Bolshevik coup in Petrograd, to March 1918, when Soviet Russia ratified the separate Brest-Litovsk peace treaty with the Quadruple Alliance. During November 1917 – February 1918, the Wilson administration’s position on the Bolshevik government in Petrograd remained uncertain. On the one hand, the United States did not recognize this government, the Council of People’s Commissars, and was trying to find out the ability of Russian anti-Bolshevik groups to overthrow it. On the other hand, the American government wanted to establish informal contacts and cooperation with the Petrograd government to prevent Russia’s withdrawal from the war and the collapse of the Eastern Front. In addition, it was necessary to prevent the Germans from obtaining military supplies from warehouses in the Russian Far East. To protect them, the Allies discussed the possibility of military intervention and encouraged the United States to take part in it. The American government rejected this possibility, primarily because of the predicted negative perception of it by the people of Russia. The U.S. also opposed Japanese intervention because believed that under the guise of common allied goals, Japan would pursue its interests in Russia, including territorial expansion. The change in the position of the Wilson administration regarding the Japanese intervention became apparent in early March 1918. Woodrow Wilson withdrew his objections to the Japanese intervention in the Russian Far East only after it became obvious that Japan would carry it out anyway. The authority for such an intervention, given to Japan by the Allies, created certain requirements and restrictions on Japanese actions, which were in Russia’s interests. The shift in the U.S. position was also caused by the signing of a separate peace with the Quadruple Alliance by the Russian Bolshevik government. After that, the President stated that the U. S. did not recognize this government even de facto, and therefore the peace treaty signed by it. However, despite the negative attitude to the Bolshevik government, W. Wilson continued to treat Russia as an ally and tried to avoid decisions that did not meet the interests of Russia’s people.
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