积极分子的目标选择与竞争结构

J. Abito, David Besanko, D. Diermeier
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引用次数: 0

摘要

本章扩展了该模型,以包括两个潜在的活动目标。研究表明,针对不同行业公司的激进分子可能会关注声誉较弱或对声誉更敏感的公司。后一项发现合理化了二次瞄准的做法,即维权人士瞄准的是一家面向消费者、非常关心自己声誉的公司,而不是其供应链中造成损害的公司。在同一行业的两个潜在目标的情况下,两家公司之间的竞争相互依赖影响目标决策。当它是弱的。例如,当公司销售差异化产品时,激进主义者倾向于把目标锁定在那些其特点使其比竞争对手更倾向于参与私人监管的公司(例如,更有耐心的公司,市场领导者)。当竞争的相互依赖性很强时——比如在大宗商品行业——激进主义者的目标是那些倾向于较少私人监管的公司。
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Target Selection by Activists and the Structure of Competition
This chapter extends the model to include two potential targets for campaigns. Activists targeting firms in different industries are shown to be likely to focus on the firm with the weaker reputation or greater sensitivity to reputation. The latter finding rationalizes the practice of secondary targeting in which an activist targets a consumer-facing company that cares a lot about its reputation rather than the companies in its supply chain creating the harm. In the case of two potential targes in the same industry, the competitive interdependence between the two firms affects the targeting decision. When it is weak—e.g., when firms sell differentiated products—the activist tends to target the firm whose characteristics predispose it to engage in more private regulation than its rival (e.g., the more patient firm, the market leader). When competitive interdependence is strong—as in commodities industries—the activist targets the firm predisposed toward less private regulation.
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An Introduction to Corporate Campaigns Do Activist Campaigns Benefit Society? A Dynamic Model of Corporate Campaigns Target Selection by Activists and the Structure of Competition Campaign Tactics
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