{"title":"合作认知无线电网络中的频谱租赁:基于拍卖的方法","authors":"Mehdi Ghamari Adian, H. Aghaeinia","doi":"10.1109/IRANIANCEE.2012.6292551","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"The problem of resource allocation in a spectrum leasing scenario in Cooperative Cognitive Radio Networks (CCRN) is addressed, in this work. The system model consists of a number of primary user (PU) pairs and a secondary user (SU) pair. We propose a solution for resource allocation problem in the spectrum leasing scenario. More specifically, we determine when is beneficial for a PU to lease its unused spectrum portion to SU and how much of PU's resource is optimum to be leased. The SU is supposed to cooperate with PUs by relaying the PUs' signals, in return. Besides, the optimum allocated cooperating power of SU to relay each PU's signals is determined. An efficient auction mechanism is proposed and the existence of the Nash Equilibrium (NE) for the proposed auction game is proved.","PeriodicalId":308726,"journal":{"name":"20th Iranian Conference on Electrical Engineering (ICEE2012)","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2012-05-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"2","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Spectrum leasing in cooperative cognitive radio networks: An auction-based approach\",\"authors\":\"Mehdi Ghamari Adian, H. Aghaeinia\",\"doi\":\"10.1109/IRANIANCEE.2012.6292551\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"The problem of resource allocation in a spectrum leasing scenario in Cooperative Cognitive Radio Networks (CCRN) is addressed, in this work. The system model consists of a number of primary user (PU) pairs and a secondary user (SU) pair. We propose a solution for resource allocation problem in the spectrum leasing scenario. More specifically, we determine when is beneficial for a PU to lease its unused spectrum portion to SU and how much of PU's resource is optimum to be leased. The SU is supposed to cooperate with PUs by relaying the PUs' signals, in return. Besides, the optimum allocated cooperating power of SU to relay each PU's signals is determined. An efficient auction mechanism is proposed and the existence of the Nash Equilibrium (NE) for the proposed auction game is proved.\",\"PeriodicalId\":308726,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"20th Iranian Conference on Electrical Engineering (ICEE2012)\",\"volume\":\"1 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2012-05-15\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"2\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"20th Iranian Conference on Electrical Engineering (ICEE2012)\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1109/IRANIANCEE.2012.6292551\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"20th Iranian Conference on Electrical Engineering (ICEE2012)","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1109/IRANIANCEE.2012.6292551","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
Spectrum leasing in cooperative cognitive radio networks: An auction-based approach
The problem of resource allocation in a spectrum leasing scenario in Cooperative Cognitive Radio Networks (CCRN) is addressed, in this work. The system model consists of a number of primary user (PU) pairs and a secondary user (SU) pair. We propose a solution for resource allocation problem in the spectrum leasing scenario. More specifically, we determine when is beneficial for a PU to lease its unused spectrum portion to SU and how much of PU's resource is optimum to be leased. The SU is supposed to cooperate with PUs by relaying the PUs' signals, in return. Besides, the optimum allocated cooperating power of SU to relay each PU's signals is determined. An efficient auction mechanism is proposed and the existence of the Nash Equilibrium (NE) for the proposed auction game is proved.