不要把胎儿诊断创新和洗澡水一起倒掉:为什么Ariosa诉Sequenom是构建健全专利资格框架的理想工具

Jeffrey A. Lefstin, Peter S. Menell
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摘要

在过去的五年中,美国最高法院重新激活了可专利主题限制,在沉寂了近三十年后发布了四项重要裁决。这些决定反映了对抽象商业方法和自然法则的专利的合理关切。同样重要的是,它们揭示了关于可专利主题范围的内部不一致和混乱,以及与专利资格法学长达几个世纪的结构之间的紧张关系。正如布雷耶法官在Alice Corp.诉CLS Bank Int 'l(2014)案的口头辩论中所说,梅奥案(2012)的判决只不过是专利资格测试“内容的一个外壳”,将大部分实质内容留给专利律师协会与联邦巡回法院共同制定。联邦巡回法院最近在Ariosa v. Sequenom一案中不加批判地接受了对Mayo的宽泛解读,这与Myriad和Alice的见解相冲突,从而危及了诊断测试和其他重要生物医学研究领域的专利保护,甚至可能危及其他领域。本法庭之友摘要敦促联邦巡回法院在Ariosa诉Sequenom案中批准全院审查,以解决最高法院专利资格裁决中未解决的关键问题。尽管《梅奥法》中的一些语言可以解释为将非常规或创造性的申请作为专利资格的可能测试,但梅奥法提出了“创造性概念”的另外两种可能性:非先发制人的申请;而非一般应用——也就是说,不仅仅是一个自然法则的陈述加上一个应用它的指令。虽然专家组正确地认识到,梅奥将优先权描述为专利资格原则的基本理由,而不是操作测试,但我们认为专家组得出梅奥规定非常规或创造性应用的结论是错误的。
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Don't Throw Out Fetal-Diagnostic Innovation with the Bathwater: Why Ariosa v. Sequenom Is an Ideal Vehicle for Constructing a Sound Patent-Eligibility Framework
Over the past five years, the U.S. Supreme Court has reinvigorated patentable subject-matter limitations, issuing four significant decisions after nearly three dormant decades. These decisions reflect justifiable concerns about the patenting of abstract business methods and laws of nature. Just as importantly, they reveal internal inconsistencies and confusion about the scope of patentable subject matter and tension with the centuries-old fabric of patent-eligibility jurisprudence. As Justice Breyer remarked at the oral argument in Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l (2014), the Mayo (2012) decision did no more than “sketch an outer shell of the content” of the patent-eligibility test, leaving much of the substance to be developed by the patent bar in conjunction with the Federal Circuit.The Federal Circuit’s recent decision in Ariosa v. Sequenom uncritically accepts an expansive reading of Mayo that conflicts with insights from Myriad and Alice, thereby jeopardizing patent protection for diagnostic testing and other vital fields of biomedical research and possibly others. This amicus brief urges the Federal Circuit to grant en banc review in Ariosa v. Sequenom to ventilate critical issues left unanswered by the Supreme Court’s patent-eligibility decisions. Although some language in Mayo could be interpreted to set forth unconventional or inventive application as a possible test for patent-eligibility, Mayo suggests two other possibilities for an “inventive concept”: non-preemptive application; and non-generic application – that is, more than a statement of a natural law coupled with an instruction to apply it. While the panel was correct to perceive that Mayo describes preemption as the underlying justification for the patent-eligibility doctrine, not the operative test, we believe that the panel was incorrect to conclude that Mayo dictates unconventional or inventive application.
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