This paper examines FRAND issues in India. From an institutional perspective, India's FRAND cases do not effectively establish the appropriate role for antitrust in FRAND. On the one hand, there is the potential for hold-up and anti-competitive conduct in the FRAND setting. Such situations would be very fact specific but the CCI orders to date use sweeping language and analysis based on per se like rules of illegality. On the other hand, the creation of per se like rules of illegality create the possibility that CCI will act as a price regulator rather than antitrust enforcer. Over time and with greater use of economic analysis (and greater reliance on the economic staff at CCI), CCI may improve its institutional capabilities. However, the role of jurisdiction as between CCI and the judiciary remains unclear. How best to treat FRAND disputes will take time but the hope is that through greater experience and learning by doing, the Indian competition system will set out a set of economically informed principles for sound FRAND enforcement.On the issue of institutional design and deference, one question that has not yet been reached (and may not for some time) is how the courts should handle deference when CCI has developed the necessary economic skills to undertake complex cases of antitrust and technology. Should the judiciary defer to agency as expert once expertise developed? This is potentially a chicken and egg problem on developing expertise and rules of deference in need of further study. Complicating matters further is that the economics on competition and patents is complex. Creating an administrable economic model that is coherent remains a work in progress.Overall the Indian FRAND cases suggest that the current mix of Indian institutions may not yet be well suited to address complex issues of antitrust enforcement. Consequently, such cases should be approached cautiously with a mind on how to think through the economics of innovation, and the implications of enforcement on technology, IP and competition to yield optimal results and the right institutional structure for improved enforcement.
{"title":"FRAND in India","authors":"Shubha Ghosh, D. Sokol","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2718256","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2718256","url":null,"abstract":"This paper examines FRAND issues in India. From an institutional perspective, India's FRAND cases do not effectively establish the appropriate role for antitrust in FRAND. On the one hand, there is the potential for hold-up and anti-competitive conduct in the FRAND setting. Such situations would be very fact specific but the CCI orders to date use sweeping language and analysis based on per se like rules of illegality. On the other hand, the creation of per se like rules of illegality create the possibility that CCI will act as a price regulator rather than antitrust enforcer. Over time and with greater use of economic analysis (and greater reliance on the economic staff at CCI), CCI may improve its institutional capabilities. However, the role of jurisdiction as between CCI and the judiciary remains unclear. How best to treat FRAND disputes will take time but the hope is that through greater experience and learning by doing, the Indian competition system will set out a set of economically informed principles for sound FRAND enforcement.On the issue of institutional design and deference, one question that has not yet been reached (and may not for some time) is how the courts should handle deference when CCI has developed the necessary economic skills to undertake complex cases of antitrust and technology. Should the judiciary defer to agency as expert once expertise developed? This is potentially a chicken and egg problem on developing expertise and rules of deference in need of further study. Complicating matters further is that the economics on competition and patents is complex. Creating an administrable economic model that is coherent remains a work in progress.Overall the Indian FRAND cases suggest that the current mix of Indian institutions may not yet be well suited to address complex issues of antitrust enforcement. Consequently, such cases should be approached cautiously with a mind on how to think through the economics of innovation, and the implications of enforcement on technology, IP and competition to yield optimal results and the right institutional structure for improved enforcement.","PeriodicalId":208710,"journal":{"name":"LSN: Patent Law/Intellectual Property (Topic)","volume":"9 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-04-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125207799","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Patents are the main source of data on innovation, but there are persistent concerns that patents may be a noisy and biased measure. An important challenge arises from unobservable variation in the size of the inventive step that is covered by a patent. The count of later patents that cite a patent as relevant prior art – so called forward citations – have become the standard measure to control for such variation. Citations may, however, also be a noisy and biased measure for the size of the inventive step. To address this issue, this paper examines field trial data for patented improvements in hybrid corn. Field trials report objective measures for improvements in hybrid corn, which we use to quantify the size of the inventive step. These data show a robust correlation between citations and improvements in yields, as the bottom line measure for improvements in hybrid corn. This correlation is robust to alternative measures for improvements in hybrid corn, and a broad range of other tests.We also investigate the process, by which patents generate citations. This analysis reveals that hybrids that serve as an input for genetically-related follow-on inventions are more likely to receive self-citations (by the same firm), which suggests that self-citations are a good predictor for follow-on invention.
{"title":"Patent Citations - An Analysis of Quality Differences and Citing Practices in Hybrid Corn","authors":"Petra Moser, Joerg Ohmstedt, P. Rhode","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2754341","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2754341","url":null,"abstract":"Patents are the main source of data on innovation, but there are persistent concerns that patents may be a noisy and biased measure. An important challenge arises from unobservable variation in the size of the inventive step that is covered by a patent. The count of later patents that cite a patent as relevant prior art – so called forward citations – have become the standard measure to control for such variation. Citations may, however, also be a noisy and biased measure for the size of the inventive step. To address this issue, this paper examines field trial data for patented improvements in hybrid corn. Field trials report objective measures for improvements in hybrid corn, which we use to quantify the size of the inventive step. These data show a robust correlation between citations and improvements in yields, as the bottom line measure for improvements in hybrid corn. This correlation is robust to alternative measures for improvements in hybrid corn, and a broad range of other tests.We also investigate the process, by which patents generate citations. This analysis reveals that hybrids that serve as an input for genetically-related follow-on inventions are more likely to receive self-citations (by the same firm), which suggests that self-citations are a good predictor for follow-on invention.","PeriodicalId":208710,"journal":{"name":"LSN: Patent Law/Intellectual Property (Topic)","volume":"184 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-03-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122729791","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We consider licensing with a patent competition for a non-drastic process innovation among firms competing in a Cournot market. We study whether licensing improves social welfare, after taking rent dissipation into account. For licensing auction, welfare worsens for minor innovations and improves for major innovations. For royalty licensing, welfare does not change. Surprisingly, when the licensor may choose between licensing auction and royalty licensing, licensing fails to improve welfare in general.
{"title":"Licensing with Patent Competition","authors":"R. Ding, Chiu Yu Ko","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2730474","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2730474","url":null,"abstract":"We consider licensing with a patent competition for a non-drastic process innovation among firms competing in a Cournot market. We study whether licensing improves social welfare, after taking rent dissipation into account. For licensing auction, welfare worsens for minor innovations and improves for major innovations. For royalty licensing, welfare does not change. Surprisingly, when the licensor may choose between licensing auction and royalty licensing, licensing fails to improve welfare in general.","PeriodicalId":208710,"journal":{"name":"LSN: Patent Law/Intellectual Property (Topic)","volume":"299302 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-02-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123447944","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
As Intellectual Property becomes increasingly vital to our nation’s wealth and prosperity, the need to ensure its protection on a global basis increases correspondingly. The American economy suffers staggering losses each year to international IP theft. According to the IP Theft Commission (2013), these losses likely exceed $300 billion annually. IP theft is an injustice to the IP owners, diminishes economic prosperity, and undermines job opportunities. Indeed, this is a reason why it is so important to conclude international trade agreements, such as the recently-negotiated Trans-Pacific Partnership, that contain meaningful intellectual property protections. The Constitution expressly makes protection of intellectual property rights an imperative of the federal government. The Intellectual Property Clause contained in Article I, Section 8, provides that Congress has the power “To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.” The IP Clause is premised on the understanding that copyrights and patent rights are property rights grounded in the intellectual and physical labors of authors and inventors. There is strong constitutional foundation for international protection of Americans’ copyrights and patent rights. The IP Clause permits protection of foreign intellectual property under federal law – or at the very least, permits it as a means of securing American IP rights abroad. Federal legal recognition of foreign IP constitutes fair play. As a matter of common sense and experience, doing justice, and providing comparable treatment to rights of foreigners facilitates foreign cooperation to protect American IP rights. Treaty-making with foreign nations constitutes another critical constitutional mechanism for securing international protections for Americans’ IP rights.
{"title":"The Logic of International Intellectual Property Protection","authors":"R. May, Seth L. Cooper","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2736659","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2736659","url":null,"abstract":"As Intellectual Property becomes increasingly vital to our nation’s wealth and prosperity, the need to ensure its protection on a global basis increases correspondingly. The American economy suffers staggering losses each year to international IP theft. According to the IP Theft Commission (2013), these losses likely exceed $300 billion annually. IP theft is an injustice to the IP owners, diminishes economic prosperity, and undermines job opportunities. Indeed, this is a reason why it is so important to conclude international trade agreements, such as the recently-negotiated Trans-Pacific Partnership, that contain meaningful intellectual property protections. The Constitution expressly makes protection of intellectual property rights an imperative of the federal government. The Intellectual Property Clause contained in Article I, Section 8, provides that Congress has the power “To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.” The IP Clause is premised on the understanding that copyrights and patent rights are property rights grounded in the intellectual and physical labors of authors and inventors. There is strong constitutional foundation for international protection of Americans’ copyrights and patent rights. The IP Clause permits protection of foreign intellectual property under federal law – or at the very least, permits it as a means of securing American IP rights abroad. Federal legal recognition of foreign IP constitutes fair play. As a matter of common sense and experience, doing justice, and providing comparable treatment to rights of foreigners facilitates foreign cooperation to protect American IP rights. Treaty-making with foreign nations constitutes another critical constitutional mechanism for securing international protections for Americans’ IP rights.","PeriodicalId":208710,"journal":{"name":"LSN: Patent Law/Intellectual Property (Topic)","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-01-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127464202","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The economic analyses of software piracy typically rely on the simplifying assumption that the product is o¤ered by a single producer. We argue that a realistic description of the software market and associated economic aspects of software piracy might be also captured by studying competition between software developers. Using an illegal version of software violates intellectual property rights (IPR) and, due to public protection (such as copyrights), is punishable when discovered. If a developer nonetheless considers the level of piracy to be high, he may introduce his own private protection. The focus of our analysis is on the interaction between public and private IPR protection in the two market structures under considerations. We show that, unlike in cases of monopolies, there is no conflict of interest between the regulator and producers in duopoly setup. Moreover, unlike in a monopoly, the optimal public IPR protection in duopoly does not affect the developers' choice of software quality.
{"title":"Modeling Software Piracy Protection: Monopoly versus Duopoly","authors":"Krešimir Žigić, Jiří Střelický, Michael Kúnin","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2685210","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2685210","url":null,"abstract":"The economic analyses of software piracy typically rely on the simplifying assumption that the product is o¤ered by a single producer. We argue that a realistic description of the software market and associated economic aspects of software piracy might be also captured by studying competition between software developers. Using an illegal version of software violates intellectual property rights (IPR) and, due to public protection (such as copyrights), is punishable when discovered. If a developer nonetheless considers the level of piracy to be high, he may introduce his own private protection. The focus of our analysis is on the interaction between public and private IPR protection in the two market structures under considerations. We show that, unlike in cases of monopolies, there is no conflict of interest between the regulator and producers in duopoly setup. Moreover, unlike in a monopoly, the optimal public IPR protection in duopoly does not affect the developers' choice of software quality.","PeriodicalId":208710,"journal":{"name":"LSN: Patent Law/Intellectual Property (Topic)","volume":"41 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126113915","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The grant of a patent depends on the technical merit and social worth of an invention under a quid pro quo arrangement where the patentee compensates society by publicly disclosing a clear description of the invention in a written document and explicitly claims those intellectual property aspects of the invention he believes are his under the patent act. By law, this description should be such that those skilled in the relevant arts can replicate the invention without undue experimentation or intellectual exertion either after acquiring a license from the patentee to do so during the life of the patent or without any license thereafter. In practice, the document is seldom written for full comprehension by relevant technical experts (a judicially ignored violation of the patent act) but for lawyers who, in patent litigation, must present their client’s case to generalist judges ignorant of the technical arts that support the patent. The arguments thus deviate from the “substance of what the patentee invented and how significant that invention really is” to “the scope of legal rights not by reference to the invention but by reference to semantic debates over the meaning of words chosen by lawyers”. To obviate these anomalies we suggest certain remedies that would enable the workload related to patent drafting, grant, validation, and infringement to be equitably shared among the patentee, the patent office, the judiciary, and the proposed Patent Validation Board.
{"title":"Reforming the Patent System for the Post-Industrial Economy","authors":"R. Bera","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2664035","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2664035","url":null,"abstract":"The grant of a patent depends on the technical merit and social worth of an invention under a quid pro quo arrangement where the patentee compensates society by publicly disclosing a clear description of the invention in a written document and explicitly claims those intellectual property aspects of the invention he believes are his under the patent act. By law, this description should be such that those skilled in the relevant arts can replicate the invention without undue experimentation or intellectual exertion either after acquiring a license from the patentee to do so during the life of the patent or without any license thereafter. In practice, the document is seldom written for full comprehension by relevant technical experts (a judicially ignored violation of the patent act) but for lawyers who, in patent litigation, must present their client’s case to generalist judges ignorant of the technical arts that support the patent. The arguments thus deviate from the “substance of what the patentee invented and how significant that invention really is” to “the scope of legal rights not by reference to the invention but by reference to semantic debates over the meaning of words chosen by lawyers”. To obviate these anomalies we suggest certain remedies that would enable the workload related to patent drafting, grant, validation, and infringement to be equitably shared among the patentee, the patent office, the judiciary, and the proposed Patent Validation Board.","PeriodicalId":208710,"journal":{"name":"LSN: Patent Law/Intellectual Property (Topic)","volume":"55 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-09-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"117051803","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Over the past five years, the U.S. Supreme Court has reinvigorated patentable subject-matter limitations, issuing four significant decisions after nearly three dormant decades. These decisions reflect justifiable concerns about the patenting of abstract business methods and laws of nature. Just as importantly, they reveal internal inconsistencies and confusion about the scope of patentable subject matter and tension with the centuries-old fabric of patent-eligibility jurisprudence. As Justice Breyer remarked at the oral argument in Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l (2014), the Mayo (2012) decision did no more than “sketch an outer shell of the content” of the patent-eligibility test, leaving much of the substance to be developed by the patent bar in conjunction with the Federal Circuit.The Federal Circuit’s recent decision in Ariosa v. Sequenom uncritically accepts an expansive reading of Mayo that conflicts with insights from Myriad and Alice, thereby jeopardizing patent protection for diagnostic testing and other vital fields of biomedical research and possibly others. This amicus brief urges the Federal Circuit to grant en banc review in Ariosa v. Sequenom to ventilate critical issues left unanswered by the Supreme Court’s patent-eligibility decisions. Although some language in Mayo could be interpreted to set forth unconventional or inventive application as a possible test for patent-eligibility, Mayo suggests two other possibilities for an “inventive concept”: non-preemptive application; and non-generic application – that is, more than a statement of a natural law coupled with an instruction to apply it. While the panel was correct to perceive that Mayo describes preemption as the underlying justification for the patent-eligibility doctrine, not the operative test, we believe that the panel was incorrect to conclude that Mayo dictates unconventional or inventive application.
在过去的五年中，美国最高法院重新激活了可专利主题限制，在沉寂了近三十年后发布了四项重要裁决。这些决定反映了对抽象商业方法和自然法则的专利的合理关切。同样重要的是，它们揭示了关于可专利主题范围的内部不一致和混乱，以及与专利资格法学长达几个世纪的结构之间的紧张关系。正如布雷耶法官在Alice Corp.诉CLS Bank Int 'l(2014)案的口头辩论中所说，梅奥案(2012)的判决只不过是专利资格测试“内容的一个外壳”，将大部分实质内容留给专利律师协会与联邦巡回法院共同制定。联邦巡回法院最近在Ariosa v. Sequenom一案中不加批判地接受了对Mayo的宽泛解读，这与Myriad和Alice的见解相冲突，从而危及了诊断测试和其他重要生物医学研究领域的专利保护，甚至可能危及其他领域。本法庭之友摘要敦促联邦巡回法院在Ariosa诉Sequenom案中批准全院审查，以解决最高法院专利资格裁决中未解决的关键问题。尽管《梅奥法》中的一些语言可以解释为将非常规或创造性的申请作为专利资格的可能测试，但梅奥法提出了“创造性概念”的另外两种可能性:非先发制人的申请;而非一般应用——也就是说，不仅仅是一个自然法则的陈述加上一个应用它的指令。虽然专家组正确地认识到，梅奥将优先权描述为专利资格原则的基本理由，而不是操作测试，但我们认为专家组得出梅奥规定非常规或创造性应用的结论是错误的。
{"title":"Don't Throw Out Fetal-Diagnostic Innovation with the Bathwater: Why Ariosa v. Sequenom Is an Ideal Vehicle for Constructing a Sound Patent-Eligibility Framework","authors":"Jeffrey A. Lefstin, Peter S. Menell","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2652452","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2652452","url":null,"abstract":"Over the past five years, the U.S. Supreme Court has reinvigorated patentable subject-matter limitations, issuing four significant decisions after nearly three dormant decades. These decisions reflect justifiable concerns about the patenting of abstract business methods and laws of nature. Just as importantly, they reveal internal inconsistencies and confusion about the scope of patentable subject matter and tension with the centuries-old fabric of patent-eligibility jurisprudence. As Justice Breyer remarked at the oral argument in Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l (2014), the Mayo (2012) decision did no more than “sketch an outer shell of the content” of the patent-eligibility test, leaving much of the substance to be developed by the patent bar in conjunction with the Federal Circuit.The Federal Circuit’s recent decision in Ariosa v. Sequenom uncritically accepts an expansive reading of Mayo that conflicts with insights from Myriad and Alice, thereby jeopardizing patent protection for diagnostic testing and other vital fields of biomedical research and possibly others. This amicus brief urges the Federal Circuit to grant en banc review in Ariosa v. Sequenom to ventilate critical issues left unanswered by the Supreme Court’s patent-eligibility decisions. Although some language in Mayo could be interpreted to set forth unconventional or inventive application as a possible test for patent-eligibility, Mayo suggests two other possibilities for an “inventive concept”: non-preemptive application; and non-generic application – that is, more than a statement of a natural law coupled with an instruction to apply it. While the panel was correct to perceive that Mayo describes preemption as the underlying justification for the patent-eligibility doctrine, not the operative test, we believe that the panel was incorrect to conclude that Mayo dictates unconventional or inventive application.","PeriodicalId":208710,"journal":{"name":"LSN: Patent Law/Intellectual Property (Topic)","volume":"27 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-08-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128372052","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The paper explores the role of institutional mechanisms in generating technological knowledge spillovers. The estimation is over panel datasets of patent grants, and unpatented innovations that were submitted for prizes at the annual industrial fairs of the American Institute of New York, during the era of early industrial expansion. The first section tests the hypothesis of spatial autocorrelation in patenting and in the exhibited innovations. In keeping with the contract theory of patents, the procedure identifies high and statistically significant spatial autocorrelation in the sample of inventions that were patented, indicating the prevalence of geographical spillovers. By contrast, prize innovations were much less likely to be spatially dependent. The second part of the paper investigates whether unpatented innovations in a county were affected by patenting in contiguous or adjacent counties, and the analysis indicates that such spatial effects were large and significant. These results are consistent with the argument that patents enhance the diffusion of information for both patented and unpatented innovations, whereas prizes are less effective in generating external benefits from knowledge spillovers. I hypothesize that the difference partly owes to the design of patent institutions, which explicitly incorporate mechanisms for systematic recording, access, and dispersion of technical information.
本文探讨了制度机制在产生技术知识溢出中的作用。这一估计是基于早期工业扩张时期，专利授权和在纽约美国学会(American Institute of New York)年度工业博览会上提交获奖的非专利创新的面板数据集。第一部分检验了专利行为和创新成果展示的空间自相关假设。根据专利契约理论，该程序确定了专利发明样本中高度且统计上显著的空间自相关性，表明地理溢出的普遍性。相比之下，奖励创新的空间依赖性要小得多。第二部分考察了相邻县的非专利创新是否受到相邻县的专利行为的影响，分析表明这种空间效应是巨大且显著的。这些结果与以下论点相一致:专利促进了专利和非专利创新的信息扩散，而奖励在从知识溢出中产生外部利益方面效率较低。我推测，这种差异部分归因于专利制度的设计，它明确地纳入了系统记录、获取和传播技术信息的机制。
{"title":"Of Time and Space: Technological Spillovers Among Patents and Unpatented Innovations During Early U.S. Industrialization","authors":"B. Khan","doi":"10.3386/W20732","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3386/W20732","url":null,"abstract":"The paper explores the role of institutional mechanisms in generating technological knowledge spillovers. The estimation is over panel datasets of patent grants, and unpatented innovations that were submitted for prizes at the annual industrial fairs of the American Institute of New York, during the era of early industrial expansion. The first section tests the hypothesis of spatial autocorrelation in patenting and in the exhibited innovations. In keeping with the contract theory of patents, the procedure identifies high and statistically significant spatial autocorrelation in the sample of inventions that were patented, indicating the prevalence of geographical spillovers. By contrast, prize innovations were much less likely to be spatially dependent. The second part of the paper investigates whether unpatented innovations in a county were affected by patenting in contiguous or adjacent counties, and the analysis indicates that such spatial effects were large and significant. These results are consistent with the argument that patents enhance the diffusion of information for both patented and unpatented innovations, whereas prizes are less effective in generating external benefits from knowledge spillovers. I hypothesize that the difference partly owes to the design of patent institutions, which explicitly incorporate mechanisms for systematic recording, access, and dispersion of technical information.","PeriodicalId":208710,"journal":{"name":"LSN: Patent Law/Intellectual Property (Topic)","volume":"14 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127791851","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2014-11-25DOI: 10.6521/NTUTJIPLM.2014.3(2).11
G. Bernstein
This short piece focuses on the growing role that that end users are playing in our patent system. It highlights that end users differ from competitors in that they lack technological sophistication, are often onetime players and tend to become involved in the patent dispute relatively late in the life of the patent. The paper proposes inclusion of end user status as a factor that weighs toward fee shifting, as the first in a set of procedural reforms, to address the new role of end users in patent litigation.
{"title":"The Rise of the End User in Patent Litigation and Attorney Fee Shifting","authors":"G. Bernstein","doi":"10.6521/NTUTJIPLM.2014.3(2).11","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.6521/NTUTJIPLM.2014.3(2).11","url":null,"abstract":"This short piece focuses on the growing role that that end users are playing in our patent system. It highlights that end users differ from competitors in that they lack technological sophistication, are often onetime players and tend to become involved in the patent dispute relatively late in the life of the patent. The paper proposes inclusion of end user status as a factor that weighs toward fee shifting, as the first in a set of procedural reforms, to address the new role of end users in patent litigation.","PeriodicalId":208710,"journal":{"name":"LSN: Patent Law/Intellectual Property (Topic)","volume":"16 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-11-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130197623","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
A person may lose his statutory right of injunction if there is inordinate delay or acquiescence in bringing an action of infringement. Acquiescence is sitting by, when another is invading the rights and spending money on it. It is a course of conduct inconsistent with the claim for exclusive rights in a trade mark, trade name etc. It implies positive acts; not merely silence or inaction such as is involved in laches. It has been held in many cases that where acquiescence is established or there is an inordinate delay in bringing an action for infringement of a trade-mark or passing off, the discretionary relief of injunction may be denied. However, there are instances where the Court has held that there may be an inordinate delay on the part of the plaintiff in bringing a suit for injunction, the application of the plaintiff for an interim injunction cannot be dismissed on the ground that the defendant has been using the mark for a number of years. This paper analyses the extent of defense available where the proprietor of the well-known mark has taken no action for a continuous period being aware about the infringement.
{"title":"Acquiescence as a Defence in Trademark Injunction Lawsuits","authors":"S. Tripathi","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2524741","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2524741","url":null,"abstract":"A person may lose his statutory right of injunction if there is inordinate delay or acquiescence in bringing an action of infringement. Acquiescence is sitting by, when another is invading the rights and spending money on it. It is a course of conduct inconsistent with the claim for exclusive rights in a trade mark, trade name etc. It implies positive acts; not merely silence or inaction such as is involved in laches. It has been held in many cases that where acquiescence is established or there is an inordinate delay in bringing an action for infringement of a trade-mark or passing off, the discretionary relief of injunction may be denied. However, there are instances where the Court has held that there may be an inordinate delay on the part of the plaintiff in bringing a suit for injunction, the application of the plaintiff for an interim injunction cannot be dismissed on the ground that the defendant has been using the mark for a number of years. This paper analyses the extent of defense available where the proprietor of the well-known mark has taken no action for a continuous period being aware about the infringement.","PeriodicalId":208710,"journal":{"name":"LSN: Patent Law/Intellectual Property (Topic)","volume":"58 3","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-11-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"113969115","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
京公网安备 11010802042870号
京ICP备2023020795号-1
扫码关注我们
求助内容：
应助结果提醒方式：