CEO行动主义与多受众的沟通

G. Melloni, Andrea Patacconi, Nick Vikander
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引用次数: 12

摘要

CEO维权主义指的是企业领导人在种族关系、性别平等或气候变化等与公司业务没有直接关系的问题上公开表明立场。在本文中,我们探讨了CEO行动主义在什么条件下可以创造企业价值。我们开发了一种模式,消费者关心他们购买的公司类型。表明立场会引发两个问题。首先,并不是所有的消费者都有相同的观点,因此,虽然有些人可能更愿意从一位激进CEO的公司购买产品,但其他人可能会望而却步。其次,如果消费者认为CEO的沟通是出于利润动机,他们可能会对其不予重视。我们表明,信誉要求CEO的沟通是公开的,并具有足够的争议性。在竞争激烈、消费者对“象征性”价值关注程度高、两极分化程度高的情况下,CEO行动主义更有可能创造企业价值。CEO行动主义与利基产品市场战略和高价格有关,而“战略模糊”(不表明立场)与大众市场战略和低价格有关。该模型揭示了内在激励型ceo的成本和收益,以及公司治理的局限性。
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CEO Activism As Communication to Multiple Audiences
CEO activism refers to corporate leaders taking a public stand on issues such as race relations, gender equality or climate change not directly related to their business. In this paper, we investigate under what conditions CEO activism can create firm value. We develop a model where consumers care about the type of firm they buy from. Taking a stand raises two issues. First, not all consumers share the same viewpoint, so while some may be more eager to buy from a firm with an activist CEO, others may be put off. Second, consumers may discount CEO communications if they perceive them to be profit motivated. We show that credibility requires CEO communications to be public and sufficiently controversial. CEO activism is more likely to create firm value when competition is strong, consumers care a lot about "symbolic" value and polarization is high. CEO activism is associated with niche product market strategies and high prices, while "strategic ambiguity" (not taking a stand) is associated with mass market strategies and low prices. The model sheds light on the costs and benefits of intrinsically motivated CEOs and the limits of corporate governance.
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