The Nature of Appearances

This chapter defends the view that seemings are experiences which have phenomenal force. It then examines different kinds of seemings and explains why some seemings have the potential to provide more justification than others. Three broad classes of seemings (and some variations among members of these classes) are distinguished: mere seemings, paired appearances, and presentational appearances. It is suggested that the strongest (i.e., most justifying) variety of seemings is the last one: those that have what Elijah Chudnoff calls “presentational phenomenology.” These seemings present the truth-maker for their content to the agent. Paired appearances––i.e., appearances that incorporate or are accompanied by sensations but lack presentational phenomenology––are less justifying. Finally, mere seemings—those that lack both sensations and presentational phenomenology––are the least justifying (though, it is argued, they still bestow a very weak positive epistemic status upon their contents).