Pub Date : 2021-11-18DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780192896872.003.0002
K. McCain, Luca Moretti
This chapter provides grounds for thinking that PC is insufficient even as a theory of non-inferential justification. Two primary problems are raised for PC. First, PC needs an account of epistemic defeat. PC includes a “no-defeater” condition. However, it is shown that once one tries to get clear on the nature of defeat and how defeaters work within the framework of PC, it becomes apparent that one needs to appeal to something more than just the comparative strength of various seemings. Second, it is argued that PC falls prey to the problem of reflective awareness. If one reflects on one’s seemings, one’s justification deriving solely from them is destroyed. So, it seems that satisfying some condition other than PC is required for reflective agents to have stable non-inferential justification. It is also shown, however, that an unexpected consequence of the problem of reflective awareness is that PC is not really subject to bootstrapping problems.
{"title":"PC Problems","authors":"K. McCain, Luca Moretti","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780192896872.003.0002","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780192896872.003.0002","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter provides grounds for thinking that PC is insufficient even as a theory of non-inferential justification. Two primary problems are raised for PC. First, PC needs an account of epistemic defeat. PC includes a “no-defeater” condition. However, it is shown that once one tries to get clear on the nature of defeat and how defeaters work within the framework of PC, it becomes apparent that one needs to appeal to something more than just the comparative strength of various seemings. Second, it is argued that PC falls prey to the problem of reflective awareness. If one reflects on one’s seemings, one’s justification deriving solely from them is destroyed. So, it seems that satisfying some condition other than PC is required for reflective agents to have stable non-inferential justification. It is also shown, however, that an unexpected consequence of the problem of reflective awareness is that PC is not really subject to bootstrapping problems.","PeriodicalId":441903,"journal":{"name":"Appearance and Explanation","volume":"35 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-11-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127664870","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-11-18DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780192896872.003.0007
K. McCain, Luca Moretti
This chapter articulates the anti-skeptical line of response afforded by PE. It is also shown that while the promised anti-skeptical bite of other appearance-based theories, such as PC, dissolves when one becomes reflectively aware of one’s own appearances, the same is not true of PE. This not only addresses a perennial concern for internalist theories but also completes the case for the superiority of PE over both PC and similar theories that do not take on board explanationist insights. This chapter shows that PE offers all that one might want from PC and much more. So, PE is an important theory of epistemic justification that is worthy of serious consideration.
{"title":"The Skeptical Challenge","authors":"K. McCain, Luca Moretti","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780192896872.003.0007","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780192896872.003.0007","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter articulates the anti-skeptical line of response afforded by PE. It is also shown that while the promised anti-skeptical bite of other appearance-based theories, such as PC, dissolves when one becomes reflectively aware of one’s own appearances, the same is not true of PE. This not only addresses a perennial concern for internalist theories but also completes the case for the superiority of PE over both PC and similar theories that do not take on board explanationist insights. This chapter shows that PE offers all that one might want from PC and much more. So, PE is an important theory of epistemic justification that is worthy of serious consideration.","PeriodicalId":441903,"journal":{"name":"Appearance and Explanation","volume":"54 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-11-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126491247","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-11-18DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780192896872.003.0005
K. McCain, Luca Moretti
This chapter further elucidates PE by explaining how it applies to multiple domains. Though the preceding chapter already touches upon some of these, here it is cashed out how PE can account for perceptual justification, memorial justification, testimonial justification, introspective justification, and a priori justification. Exploring the contours of PE in this way reveals just how powerful and unified the theory is. Along the way, it is argued that Declan Smithies’ forceful objections to PC fail to impugn PE. Additionally, it is shown that PE has the resources to respond to each of the challenges that Smithies claims are faced by any internalist theory with “global ambitions”––any theory that purports to be a comprehensive account of epistemic justification. (These challenges for instance include the problem of forgotten evidence and the problem of stored beliefs.) The discussion in this chapter makes it clear that PE is a comprehensive account of epistemic justification that achieves its global ambitions.
{"title":"Phenomenal Explanationism’s Global Ambitions","authors":"K. McCain, Luca Moretti","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780192896872.003.0005","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780192896872.003.0005","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter further elucidates PE by explaining how it applies to multiple domains. Though the preceding chapter already touches upon some of these, here it is cashed out how PE can account for perceptual justification, memorial justification, testimonial justification, introspective justification, and a priori justification. Exploring the contours of PE in this way reveals just how powerful and unified the theory is. Along the way, it is argued that Declan Smithies’ forceful objections to PC fail to impugn PE. Additionally, it is shown that PE has the resources to respond to each of the challenges that Smithies claims are faced by any internalist theory with “global ambitions”––any theory that purports to be a comprehensive account of epistemic justification. (These challenges for instance include the problem of forgotten evidence and the problem of stored beliefs.) The discussion in this chapter makes it clear that PE is a comprehensive account of epistemic justification that achieves its global ambitions.","PeriodicalId":441903,"journal":{"name":"Appearance and Explanation","volume":"10 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-11-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116792954","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-11-18DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780192896872.003.0001
K. McCain, Luca Moretti
This chapter discusses Phenomenal Conservatism (PC) and its promises as a theory of epistemic justification. It also explores common objections raised against PC including that it is too liberal, it conflicts with Bayesianism, and it runs afoul of cognitive penetration. It is argued that these common objections fail to pose a genuine threat to PC. Additionally, it is argued that there are a number of benefits provided by the appearance-based approach to epistemic justification championed by PC. As a result, this chapter shows that PC is a good starting point for theorizing about the nature of epistemic justification even though it cannot make good on all of its promises.
{"title":"Phenomenal Conservatism and Its Promises","authors":"K. McCain, Luca Moretti","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780192896872.003.0001","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780192896872.003.0001","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter discusses Phenomenal Conservatism (PC) and its promises as a theory of epistemic justification. It also explores common objections raised against PC including that it is too liberal, it conflicts with Bayesianism, and it runs afoul of cognitive penetration. It is argued that these common objections fail to pose a genuine threat to PC. Additionally, it is argued that there are a number of benefits provided by the appearance-based approach to epistemic justification championed by PC. As a result, this chapter shows that PC is a good starting point for theorizing about the nature of epistemic justification even though it cannot make good on all of its promises.","PeriodicalId":441903,"journal":{"name":"Appearance and Explanation","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-11-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130428751","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-11-18DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780192896872.003.0003
K. McCain, Luca Moretti
This chapter defends the view that seemings are experiences which have phenomenal force. It then examines different kinds of seemings and explains why some seemings have the potential to provide more justification than others. Three broad classes of seemings (and some variations among members of these classes) are distinguished: mere seemings, paired appearances, and presentational appearances. It is suggested that the strongest (i.e., most justifying) variety of seemings is the last one: those that have what Elijah Chudnoff calls “presentational phenomenology.” These seemings present the truth-maker for their content to the agent. Paired appearances––i.e., appearances that incorporate or are accompanied by sensations but lack presentational phenomenology––are less justifying. Finally, mere seemings—those that lack both sensations and presentational phenomenology––are the least justifying (though, it is argued, they still bestow a very weak positive epistemic status upon their contents).
{"title":"The Nature of Appearances","authors":"K. McCain, Luca Moretti","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780192896872.003.0003","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780192896872.003.0003","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter defends the view that seemings are experiences which have phenomenal force. It then examines different kinds of seemings and explains why some seemings have the potential to provide more justification than others. Three broad classes of seemings (and some variations among members of these classes) are distinguished: mere seemings, paired appearances, and presentational appearances. It is suggested that the strongest (i.e., most justifying) variety of seemings is the last one: those that have what Elijah Chudnoff calls “presentational phenomenology.” These seemings present the truth-maker for their content to the agent. Paired appearances––i.e., appearances that incorporate or are accompanied by sensations but lack presentational phenomenology––are less justifying. Finally, mere seemings—those that lack both sensations and presentational phenomenology––are the least justifying (though, it is argued, they still bestow a very weak positive epistemic status upon their contents).","PeriodicalId":441903,"journal":{"name":"Appearance and Explanation","volume":"37 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-11-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128797365","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-11-18DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780192896872.003.0004
K. McCain, Luca Moretti
This chapter incorporates a sophisticated version of PC (one that draws on the distinctions between kinds of appearances that explained in Chapter 3) into a broader explanationist framework to produce the view that is defended in this book: Phenomenal Explanationism (PE). Explanationism is an account of evidential support, i.e., of how and when evidence supports particular doxastic attitudes toward propositions. However, on its own, Explanationism does not say what evidence is or when one has a particular bit of information as evidence. This is true even when Explanationism is construed, as this chapter does, in terms of mentalist evidentialism. As a theory of evidential support, mentalist Explanationism leaves open which mental states constitute one’s evidence. Explanationism can thus be readily combined with different theories of evidence and evidence possession. If PC is understood as a theory of basic evidence, the sophisticated version of PC can be combined with Explanationism. This chapter introduces a specific version of Explanationism and describes how this variant of PC can be incorporated into it to produce PE. It also describes how PE accounts for both non-inferential and inferential justification (both deductive and inductive). Finally, it explores how PE overcomes the challenges to PC raised in Chapter 2.
{"title":"Phenomenal Explanationism","authors":"K. McCain, Luca Moretti","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780192896872.003.0004","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780192896872.003.0004","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter incorporates a sophisticated version of PC (one that draws on the distinctions between kinds of appearances that explained in Chapter 3) into a broader explanationist framework to produce the view that is defended in this book: Phenomenal Explanationism (PE). Explanationism is an account of evidential support, i.e., of how and when evidence supports particular doxastic attitudes toward propositions. However, on its own, Explanationism does not say what evidence is or when one has a particular bit of information as evidence. This is true even when Explanationism is construed, as this chapter does, in terms of mentalist evidentialism. As a theory of evidential support, mentalist Explanationism leaves open which mental states constitute one’s evidence. Explanationism can thus be readily combined with different theories of evidence and evidence possession. If PC is understood as a theory of basic evidence, the sophisticated version of PC can be combined with Explanationism. This chapter introduces a specific version of Explanationism and describes how this variant of PC can be incorporated into it to produce PE. It also describes how PE accounts for both non-inferential and inferential justification (both deductive and inductive). Finally, it explores how PE overcomes the challenges to PC raised in Chapter 2.","PeriodicalId":441903,"journal":{"name":"Appearance and Explanation","volume":"41 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-11-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114612881","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-11-18DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780192896872.003.0006
K. McCain, Luca Moretti
This chapter situates PE within the context of the broader debate between Epistemic Liberalism (which holds, roughly, that it is reasonable to grant that things are the way they appear to be unless there is reason for doubting it) and Epistemic Conservatism (the view that, roughly, it is not reasonable to grant that things are the way they appear to be unless there is independent reason to think that the appearances are reliable). PE is squarely within the Liberal camp. Therefore, after explaining some of the primary elements of Liberal/Conservative debate in epistemology, two of the primary challenges faced by Liberal views like PE are examined. The first is, again, the problem of bootstrapping, which any theory that allows for immediate justification seems to run into. The second is White’s Bayesian objection to PC (introduced in Chapter 1), according to which Liberalism, and so PE, is flawed because it is incompatible with probabilistic reasoning. It is shown that PE is not troubled by these challenges. The upshot of the chapter is that Liberalism, when exemplified in PE, is victorious over Conservatism.
{"title":"Phenomenal Explanationism vs Conservatism","authors":"K. McCain, Luca Moretti","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780192896872.003.0006","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780192896872.003.0006","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter situates PE within the context of the broader debate between Epistemic Liberalism (which holds, roughly, that it is reasonable to grant that things are the way they appear to be unless there is reason for doubting it) and Epistemic Conservatism (the view that, roughly, it is not reasonable to grant that things are the way they appear to be unless there is independent reason to think that the appearances are reliable). PE is squarely within the Liberal camp. Therefore, after explaining some of the primary elements of Liberal/Conservative debate in epistemology, two of the primary challenges faced by Liberal views like PE are examined. The first is, again, the problem of bootstrapping, which any theory that allows for immediate justification seems to run into. The second is White’s Bayesian objection to PC (introduced in Chapter 1), according to which Liberalism, and so PE, is flawed because it is incompatible with probabilistic reasoning. It is shown that PE is not troubled by these challenges. The upshot of the chapter is that Liberalism, when exemplified in PE, is victorious over Conservatism.","PeriodicalId":441903,"journal":{"name":"Appearance and Explanation","volume":"4 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-11-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130239742","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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