基于puf的低开销安全扫描设计

Wei Zhou, Aijiao Cui, Cassi Chen, Gang Qu
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引用次数: 1

摘要

基于扫描的侧信道攻击已经成为对加密芯片安全的严重威胁,锁定机制是抵御此类攻击的最有效方法之一。然而,保护锁定扫描的测试密钥,但必须在测试工程师之间共享,这是一个新的挑战。在本文中,我们通过采用物理不可克隆功能(PUF)设计来生成每个芯片唯一的测试密钥来解决这一挑战。为了提高PUF响应的可靠性,在首次生成PUF响应时采用了一次性编程结构(OTPS)。PUF响应的安全性是通过混淆实现的,这样只有在出现特定的验证测试向量时才能检索它。我们通过重用原始扫描链来实现所提出的安全扫描设计,以减少开销。我们证明了所提出的安全扫描设计可以保护加密芯片免受所有现有的基于扫描的侧信道攻击,同时产生可忽略不计的低开销。
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A Low-overhead PUF-based Secure Scan Design
Scan-based side-channel attacks have become a severe threat to the security of cryptographic chips and locking mechanisms are one of the most effective methods against these attacks. However, securing the test key that locks the scan but must be shared among test engineers arises as a new challenge. In this paper, we solve this challenge by adopting the physical unclonable function (PUF) design to generate test keys that are unique for each chip. A one-time programming structure (OTPS) is used when the PUF response is first generated to improve its reliability. The security of the PUF response is achieved by obfuscation such that it can be retrieved only when a specific validation test vector presents. We implement the proposed secure scan design by reusing the original scan chain to reduce overhead. We demonstrate that the proposed secure scan design can protect the crypto chips against all existing scan-based side-channel attacks while incurring negligibly low overhead.
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