{"title":"安全实时片上网络中路由随机化的侧信道攻击弹性","authors":"L. Indrusiak, J. Harbin, Martha Johanna Sepúlveda","doi":"10.1109/ReCoSoC.2017.8016142","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Security can be seen as an optimization objective in NoC resource management, and as such poses trade-offs against other objectives such as real-time schedulability. In this paper, we show how to increase NoC resilience against a concrete type of security attack, named side-channel attack, which exploit the correlation between specific non-functional properties (such as packet latencies and routes, in the case of NoCs) to infer the functional behaviour of secure applications. For instance, the transmission of a packet over a given link of the NoC may hint on a cache miss, which can be used by an attacker to guess specific parts of a secret cryptographic key, effectively weakening it. We therefore propose packet route randomization as a mechanism to increase NoC resilience against side-channel attacks, focusing specifically on the potential impact of such an approach upon hard real-time systems, where schedulability is a vital design requirement. Using an evolutionary optimization approach, we show how to effectively apply route randomization in such a way that it can increase NoC security while controlling its impact on hard real-time performance guarantees. Extensive experimental evidence based on analytical and simulation models supports our findings.","PeriodicalId":393701,"journal":{"name":"2017 12th International Symposium on Reconfigurable Communication-centric Systems-on-Chip (ReCoSoC)","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2016-07-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"19","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Side-channel attack resilience through route randomisation in secure real-time Networks-on-Chip\",\"authors\":\"L. Indrusiak, J. Harbin, Martha Johanna Sepúlveda\",\"doi\":\"10.1109/ReCoSoC.2017.8016142\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"Security can be seen as an optimization objective in NoC resource management, and as such poses trade-offs against other objectives such as real-time schedulability. In this paper, we show how to increase NoC resilience against a concrete type of security attack, named side-channel attack, which exploit the correlation between specific non-functional properties (such as packet latencies and routes, in the case of NoCs) to infer the functional behaviour of secure applications. For instance, the transmission of a packet over a given link of the NoC may hint on a cache miss, which can be used by an attacker to guess specific parts of a secret cryptographic key, effectively weakening it. We therefore propose packet route randomization as a mechanism to increase NoC resilience against side-channel attacks, focusing specifically on the potential impact of such an approach upon hard real-time systems, where schedulability is a vital design requirement. Using an evolutionary optimization approach, we show how to effectively apply route randomization in such a way that it can increase NoC security while controlling its impact on hard real-time performance guarantees. Extensive experimental evidence based on analytical and simulation models supports our findings.\",\"PeriodicalId\":393701,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"2017 12th International Symposium on Reconfigurable Communication-centric Systems-on-Chip (ReCoSoC)\",\"volume\":null,\"pages\":null},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2016-07-12\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"19\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"2017 12th International Symposium on Reconfigurable Communication-centric Systems-on-Chip (ReCoSoC)\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1109/ReCoSoC.2017.8016142\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"2017 12th International Symposium on Reconfigurable Communication-centric Systems-on-Chip (ReCoSoC)","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1109/ReCoSoC.2017.8016142","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
Side-channel attack resilience through route randomisation in secure real-time Networks-on-Chip
Security can be seen as an optimization objective in NoC resource management, and as such poses trade-offs against other objectives such as real-time schedulability. In this paper, we show how to increase NoC resilience against a concrete type of security attack, named side-channel attack, which exploit the correlation between specific non-functional properties (such as packet latencies and routes, in the case of NoCs) to infer the functional behaviour of secure applications. For instance, the transmission of a packet over a given link of the NoC may hint on a cache miss, which can be used by an attacker to guess specific parts of a secret cryptographic key, effectively weakening it. We therefore propose packet route randomization as a mechanism to increase NoC resilience against side-channel attacks, focusing specifically on the potential impact of such an approach upon hard real-time systems, where schedulability is a vital design requirement. Using an evolutionary optimization approach, we show how to effectively apply route randomization in such a way that it can increase NoC security while controlling its impact on hard real-time performance guarantees. Extensive experimental evidence based on analytical and simulation models supports our findings.