并非一切都是为了投资者:强制披露股东信息的理由

A. Lipton
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引用次数: 13

摘要

公司经常被要求披露信息,但只有联邦证券法规定了广泛的公开披露义务,以提供对公司运营的整体概述。尽管这些信息披露的目的是为了让投资者受益,但任何人都可以获得这些信息,因此,监管机构、竞争对手、雇员和当地社区长期以来都依赖这些信息来提供该国经济生活的工作概况。今天,这个系统正在崩溃。美国国会和美国证券交易委员会(SEC)让企业更容易在不受证券披露制度约束的情况下筹集资金,这使得现代企业能够发展到庞大的规模,同时让公众对它们的运营一无所知。与此同时,政府赋予大投资者的信息优势使他们能够以牺牲消费者、员工和其他公司利益相关者的利益为代价,使管理者的行为向有利于自己的方向倾斜。因此,证券披露不能提供维持社会对公司行为控制所必需的全面情况。本文建议我们明确承认信息披露对非投资者受众的重要性,并讨论设计符合其利益的信息披露制度的可行性。在此基础上,本文挖掘了利益相关者导向信息披露提案的历史脉络。无论是在进步时代,还是在20世纪70年代,建立普遍的公司披露义务的努力都是司空见惯的。然而,在每个时代,它们都被重新定向到投资者受众,期望投资者能代表更广泛的社会。正如本条规定的那样,这种妥协不再站得住脚。
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Not Everything is About Investors: The Case for Mandatory Stakeholder Disclosure
Corporations are constantly required to disclose information, but only the federal securities laws impose generalized public disclosure obligations that offer a holistic overview of corporate operations. Though these disclosures are intended to benefit investors, they are accessible by anyone, and thus have long been relied upon by regulators, competitors, employees, and local communities to provide a working portrait of the country’s economic life. Today, that system is breaking down. Congress and the SEC have made it easier for companies to raise capital without becoming subject to the securities disclosure system, allowing modern businesses to grow to enormous proportions while leaving the public in the dark about their operations. Meanwhile, the governmentally-conferred informational advantage of large investors allows them to tilt managers’ behavior in their favor, at the expense of consumers, employees, and other corporate stakeholders. As a result, securities disclosures do not provide the comprehensive picture necessary to maintain social control over corporate behavior. This Article recommends that we explicitly acknowledge the importance of disclosure for noninvestor audiences, and discuss the feasibility of designing a disclosure system geared to their interests. In so doing, this Article excavates the historical pedigree of proposals for stakeholder-oriented disclosure. Both in the Progressive Era, and again during the 1970s, efforts to create generalized corporate disclosure obligations were commonplace. In each era, however, they were redirected towards investor audiences, in the expectation that investors would serve as a proxy for the broader society. As this Article establishes, that compromise is no longer tenable.
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