While macro-corporate-governance (e.g., addressing how a governance process should be administered within a corporate structure) seems to be widely discussed in academic literature, a discussion of micro-corporate-governance (e.g., assessing specific models, including regarding whether they accurately represent a corporate risk exposure) seems sparse, as does midi-corporate-governance (e.g., the model validation process itself, as an administered process toward specific models). An important part of corporate governance (CG) is the model validation (MV) process, with one example of micro-CGMV being how “strictly informational cascades” can influence a validation process, even perhaps suggesting that model validation is not required. Yet, such cascades are not often transparent, and not often detected by validators who are not technically trained. This paper illustrates how a variety of “attention directing tools” used as “fast and frugal heuristics” can help in the model validation process in general and the specific task of identifying “strictly informational cascades.” The tools are applied toward the Black-Scholes-Merton Model, a seminal financial derivatives model that is approaching a 50th anniversary of publication, and are illustrated to demonstrate that lessons can be learned to apply to more-complex models and more-complex financial instruments.
{"title":"On the Micro-Corporate-Governance of a Strictly Informational Cascade, As Illustrated with Analysis of the Performativity of the Black-Scholes-Merton Model","authors":"Henry Wurts","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3857857","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3857857","url":null,"abstract":"While macro-corporate-governance (e.g., addressing how a governance process should be administered within a corporate structure) seems to be widely discussed in academic literature, a discussion of micro-corporate-governance (e.g., assessing specific models, including regarding whether they accurately represent a corporate risk exposure) seems sparse, as does midi-corporate-governance (e.g., the model validation process itself, as an administered process toward specific models). An important part of corporate governance (CG) is the model validation (MV) process, with one example of micro-CGMV being how “strictly informational cascades” can influence a validation process, even perhaps suggesting that model validation is not required. Yet, such cascades are not often transparent, and not often detected by validators who are not technically trained. This paper illustrates how a variety of “attention directing tools” used as “fast and frugal heuristics” can help in the model validation process in general and the specific task of identifying “strictly informational cascades.” The tools are applied toward the Black-Scholes-Merton Model, a seminal financial derivatives model that is approaching a 50th anniversary of publication, and are illustrated to demonstrate that lessons can be learned to apply to more-complex models and more-complex financial instruments.","PeriodicalId":265444,"journal":{"name":"CGN: Other Corporate Governance: Economic Consequences","volume":"104 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-06-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122662605","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract The relationship between history and economics as academic disciplines is methodologically subtle and sociologically contested. If the Cliometric revolution can be characterized as an acquisition of economics by history, the most recent trends in Historical Economics appear to turn this relationship on its head. In this Introduction we read the chapters of the Handbook as a forceful argument in favor of a merger between the two disciplines rather than the acquisition of one by the other; a merger which combines, notably, the detailed knowledge of historical sources, the capability of distilling complex historical processes into a model, and the statistical/econometric skills for identification and estimation.
{"title":"Merger or Acquisition? Introduction to the Handbook of Historical Economics","authors":"Alberto Bisin, G. Federico","doi":"10.3386/W28786","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3386/W28786","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract The relationship between history and economics as academic disciplines is methodologically subtle and sociologically contested. If the Cliometric revolution can be characterized as an acquisition of economics by history, the most recent trends in Historical Economics appear to turn this relationship on its head. In this Introduction we read the chapters of the Handbook as a forceful argument in favor of a merger between the two disciplines rather than the acquisition of one by the other; a merger which combines, notably, the detailed knowledge of historical sources, the capability of distilling complex historical processes into a model, and the statistical/econometric skills for identification and estimation.","PeriodicalId":265444,"journal":{"name":"CGN: Other Corporate Governance: Economic Consequences","volume":"10 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126856213","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Corporate purpose is now the focus of a fundamental and heated debate, with rapidly growing support for the proposition that corporations should move from shareholder value maximization to “stakeholder governance” and “stakeholder capitalism.” This Article critically examines the increasingly influential “stakeholderism” view, according to which corporate leaders should give weight not only to the interests of shareholders but also to those of all other corporate constituencies (including employees, customers, suppliers, and the environment). We conduct a conceptual, economic, and empirical analysis of stakeholderism and its expected consequences. We conclude that this view should be rejected, including by those who care deeply about the welfare of stakeholders. Stakeholderism, we demonstrate, would not benefit stakeholders as its supporters claim. To examine the expected consequences of stakeholderism, we analyze the incentives of corporate leaders, empirically investigate whether they have in the past used their discretion to protect stakeholders, and examine whether recent commitments to adopt stakeholderism can be expected to bring about a meaningful change. Our analysis concludes that acceptance of stakeholderism should not be expected to make stakeholders better off. Furthermore, we show that embracing stakeholderism could well impose substantial costs on shareholders, stakeholders, and society at large. Stakeholderism would increase the insulation of corporate leaders from shareholders, reduce their accountability, and hurt economic performance. In addition, by raising illusory hopes that corporate leaders would on their own provide substantial protection to stakeholders, stakeholderism would impede or delay reforms that could bring meaningful protection to stakeholders. Stakeholderism would therefore be contrary to the interests of the stakeholders it purports to serve and should be opposed by those who take stakeholder interests seriously. Presentation slides for this paper are available on SSRN here. This paper is part of a larger research project of the Harvard Law School Corporate Governance on stakeholder capitalism and stakeholderism. Another part of this research project is For Whom Corporate Leaders Bargain by Lucian A. Bebchuk, Kobi Kastiel, and Roberto Tallarita.
公司目标现在是一场根本性的激烈辩论的焦点，越来越多的人支持公司应该从股东价值最大化转向“利益相关者治理”和“利益相关者资本主义”。本文批判性地审视了越来越有影响力的“利益相关者主义”观点，根据该观点，企业领导者不仅应该重视股东的利益，还应该重视所有其他企业利益相关者(包括员工、客户、供应商和环境)的利益。我们对利益相关者主义及其预期后果进行了概念、经济和实证分析。我们的结论是，这种观点应该被拒绝，包括那些非常关心利益相关者福利的人。我们证明，利益相关者主义不会像其支持者所说的那样使利益相关者受益。为了检验利益相关者主义的预期后果，我们分析了企业领导人的激励，实证调查了他们过去是否使用其自由裁量权来保护利益相关者，并检验了最近采用利益相关者主义的承诺是否可以预期带来有意义的变化。我们的分析得出的结论是，不应期望接受利益相关者主义会使利益相关者变得更好。此外，我们表明，接受利益相关者主义很可能会给股东、利益相关者和整个社会带来巨大的成本。利益相关者主义将增加企业领导人与股东之间的隔离，减少他们的责任，并损害经济表现。此外，利益相关者主义会让人产生不切实际的希望，以为企业领导人会自行为利益相关者提供实质性保护，从而阻碍或拖延可能给利益相关者带来有意义保护的改革。因此，利益相关者主义与它所要服务的利益相关者的利益相抵触，应该受到那些认真对待利益相关者利益的人的反对。这篇论文的幻灯片可以在SSRN上找到。本文是哈佛大学法学院关于利益相关者资本主义和利益相关者主义的公司治理研究项目的一部分。本研究项目的另一部分是Lucian A. Bebchuk、Kobi Kastiel和Roberto Tallarita合著的《企业领导者为谁讨价还价》。
{"title":"The Illusory Promise of Stakeholder Governance: Presentation Slides","authors":"L. Bebchuk, Roberto Tallarita","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3581299","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3581299","url":null,"abstract":"Corporate purpose is now the focus of a fundamental and heated debate, with rapidly growing support for the proposition that corporations should move from shareholder value maximization to “stakeholder governance” and “stakeholder capitalism.” This Article critically examines the increasingly influential “stakeholderism” view, according to which corporate leaders should give weight not only to the interests of shareholders but also to those of all other corporate constituencies (including employees, customers, suppliers, and the environment). We conduct a conceptual, economic, and empirical analysis of stakeholderism and its expected consequences. We conclude that this view should be rejected, including by those who care deeply about the welfare of stakeholders. \u0000 \u0000Stakeholderism, we demonstrate, would not benefit stakeholders as its supporters claim. To examine the expected consequences of stakeholderism, we analyze the incentives of corporate leaders, empirically investigate whether they have in the past used their discretion to protect stakeholders, and examine whether recent commitments to adopt stakeholderism can be expected to bring about a meaningful change. Our analysis concludes that acceptance of stakeholderism should not be expected to make stakeholders better off. \u0000 \u0000Furthermore, we show that embracing stakeholderism could well impose substantial costs on shareholders, stakeholders, and society at large. Stakeholderism would increase the insulation of corporate leaders from shareholders, reduce their accountability, and hurt economic performance. In addition, by raising illusory hopes that corporate leaders would on their own provide substantial protection to stakeholders, stakeholderism would impede or delay reforms that could bring meaningful protection to stakeholders. Stakeholderism would therefore be contrary to the interests of the stakeholders it purports to serve and should be opposed by those who take stakeholder interests seriously. \u0000 \u0000Presentation slides for this paper are available on SSRN here. \u0000 \u0000This paper is part of a larger research project of the Harvard Law School Corporate Governance on stakeholder capitalism and stakeholderism. Another part of this research project is For Whom Corporate Leaders Bargain by Lucian A. Bebchuk, Kobi Kastiel, and Roberto Tallarita.","PeriodicalId":265444,"journal":{"name":"CGN: Other Corporate Governance: Economic Consequences","volume":"2010 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-02-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125626948","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Corporations are constantly required to disclose information, but only the federal securities laws impose generalized public disclosure obligations that offer a holistic overview of corporate operations. Though these disclosures are intended to benefit investors, they are accessible by anyone, and thus have long been relied upon by regulators, competitors, employees, and local communities to provide a working portrait of the country’s economic life. Today, that system is breaking down. Congress and the SEC have made it easier for companies to raise capital without becoming subject to the securities disclosure system, allowing modern businesses to grow to enormous proportions while leaving the public in the dark about their operations. Meanwhile, the governmentally-conferred informational advantage of large investors allows them to tilt managers’ behavior in their favor, at the expense of consumers, employees, and other corporate stakeholders. As a result, securities disclosures do not provide the comprehensive picture necessary to maintain social control over corporate behavior. This Article recommends that we explicitly acknowledge the importance of disclosure for noninvestor audiences, and discuss the feasibility of designing a disclosure system geared to their interests. In so doing, this Article excavates the historical pedigree of proposals for stakeholder-oriented disclosure. Both in the Progressive Era, and again during the 1970s, efforts to create generalized corporate disclosure obligations were commonplace. In each era, however, they were redirected towards investor audiences, in the expectation that investors would serve as a proxy for the broader society. As this Article establishes, that compromise is no longer tenable.
{"title":"Not Everything is About Investors: The Case for Mandatory Stakeholder Disclosure","authors":"A. Lipton","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.3435578","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.3435578","url":null,"abstract":"Corporations are constantly required to disclose information, but only the federal securities laws impose generalized public disclosure obligations that offer a holistic overview of corporate operations. Though these disclosures are intended to benefit investors, they are accessible by anyone, and thus have long been relied upon by regulators, competitors, employees, and local communities to provide a working portrait of the country’s economic life. \u0000 \u0000Today, that system is breaking down. Congress and the SEC have made it easier for companies to raise capital without becoming subject to the securities disclosure system, allowing modern businesses to grow to enormous proportions while leaving the public in the dark about their operations. Meanwhile, the governmentally-conferred informational advantage of large investors allows them to tilt managers’ behavior in their favor, at the expense of consumers, employees, and other corporate stakeholders. As a result, securities disclosures do not provide the comprehensive picture necessary to maintain social control over corporate behavior. \u0000 \u0000This Article recommends that we explicitly acknowledge the importance of disclosure for noninvestor audiences, and discuss the feasibility of designing a disclosure system geared to their interests. In so doing, this Article excavates the historical pedigree of proposals for stakeholder-oriented disclosure. Both in the Progressive Era, and again during the 1970s, efforts to create generalized corporate disclosure obligations were commonplace. In each era, however, they were redirected towards investor audiences, in the expectation that investors would serve as a proxy for the broader society. As this Article establishes, that compromise is no longer tenable.","PeriodicalId":265444,"journal":{"name":"CGN: Other Corporate Governance: Economic Consequences","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-08-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128976953","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper examines the impact of politicians' ideological preferences on corporate taxation. Our tests exploit the implementation of the Reform and Opening-up policy in China in 1978 that significantly weakens the communist ideology. We find that, in the post-reform period, the effective tax rates of firms in cities whose secretaries joined the communist party before the reform, and therefore, were indoctrinated with stronger communist ideology, are significantly higher than those of firms with secretaries joining the communist party after the reform. This effect is weaker for party secretaries close to retirement and for party secretaries with working experience in the central government. Further tests suggest that party secretaries' communist ideology affect corporate taxation through both tax benefit provisions and enforcement of tax rules. A regression discontinuity design approach exploiting the age qualification of party members provides consistent results.
{"title":"Politicians' Ideology, State Intervention, and Corporate Taxation","authors":"Ke Na, T. Shevlin, Danqing Wang, Wenjia Yan","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3561306","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3561306","url":null,"abstract":"This paper examines the impact of politicians' ideological preferences on corporate taxation. Our tests exploit the implementation of the Reform and Opening-up policy in China in 1978 that significantly weakens the communist ideology. We find that, in the post-reform period, the effective tax rates of firms in cities whose secretaries joined the communist party before the reform, and therefore, were indoctrinated with stronger communist ideology, are significantly higher than those of firms with secretaries joining the communist party after the reform. This effect is weaker for party secretaries close to retirement and for party secretaries with working experience in the central government. Further tests suggest that party secretaries' communist ideology affect corporate taxation through both tax benefit provisions and enforcement of tax rules. A regression discontinuity design approach exploiting the age qualification of party members provides consistent results.","PeriodicalId":265444,"journal":{"name":"CGN: Other Corporate Governance: Economic Consequences","volume":"87 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125053495","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Lehman Brother’s corporate governance mechanisms and internal controls had several flaws that led to the downfall of the organization. The company lacked corporate governance measures that could highlight the fraudulent activities within the company. Corporate governance in any organization is controlled by the shareholders (owners) of the company, the directors of the company and its managers who utilize the company’s assets. The four pillars of corporate governance are accountability, fairness, transparency and independence. The role of banking reforms in controlling financial institutions have been in place for long.
{"title":"The Strengths and Weaknesses of Lehman Brothers’ Corporate Governance Mechanisms and Internal Controls","authors":"Chenoy Ceil","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3521071","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3521071","url":null,"abstract":"Lehman Brother’s corporate governance mechanisms and internal controls had several flaws that led to the downfall of the organization. The company lacked corporate governance measures that could highlight the fraudulent activities within the company. Corporate governance in any organization is controlled by the shareholders (owners) of the company, the directors of the company and its managers who utilize the company’s assets. The four pillars of corporate governance are accountability, fairness, transparency and independence. The role of banking reforms in controlling financial institutions have been in place for long.","PeriodicalId":265444,"journal":{"name":"CGN: Other Corporate Governance: Economic Consequences","volume":"103 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-03-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127430334","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Does corporate governance play a role in income inequality? If so, how? This paper pursues this inquiry, beginning with an examination of the causes of significant income inequality throughout twentieth and early twenty-first century American history. The parallel developments of financial practices and board structures over these periods reveal the relatively contemporaneous rises of shareholder valuism and the modern monitoring board, with the latter providing institutional structure and norm propagation for the former, thus serving as a corporate governance channel through which income inequality is perpetuated. History further reveals the monitoring board to be an institutional component of finance capitalism, and the so-called managerial board that dominated during a period of relative income equality to be an institutional component of industrial capitalism.
{"title":"Corporate Governance and Income Inequality: The Role of the Monitoring Board","authors":"Ezra Wasserman Mitchell","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2842136","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2842136","url":null,"abstract":"Does corporate governance play a role in income inequality? If so, how? This paper pursues this inquiry, beginning with an examination of the causes of significant income inequality throughout twentieth and early twenty-first century American history. The parallel developments of financial practices and board structures over these periods reveal the relatively contemporaneous rises of shareholder valuism and the modern monitoring board, with the latter providing institutional structure and norm propagation for the former, thus serving as a corporate governance channel through which income inequality is perpetuated. History further reveals the monitoring board to be an institutional component of finance capitalism, and the so-called managerial board that dominated during a period of relative income equality to be an institutional component of industrial capitalism.","PeriodicalId":265444,"journal":{"name":"CGN: Other Corporate Governance: Economic Consequences","volume":"100 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-08-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134408508","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
What are the dynamics through which corporate boards led by dominant CEOs fail? We address this question by examining the case of Anglo Irish Bank. We focus on the dynamics in and around Anglo’s board of directors in the 3-year period leading to its collapse in 2008. Using documentary analysis and 21 interviews with Anglo’s senior managers and other key actors, we identify two interrelated sets of dynamics: a dominant CEO who used his influence to populate the board with affiliated individuals, leading to a low-skilled board and increasing further his dominance; and the establishment of norms whereby stock ownership signified loyalty rather than commitment to performance. We suggest these dynamics reflect a broader organisational change where new meanings were assigned to existing corporate practices, leading to poor scrutiny of executive decisions and subversion of intended incentives. Our findings contribute to the literature on managerial entrenchment by shedding light on how undesirable consequences of stock ownership are likely to emerge. More generally, we contribute to the management and corporate governance literatures by showing the dynamic and interdependent nature of factors that contribute to the emergence of organisational vulnerabilities and ultimately to corporate failures.
{"title":"The Dynamics of Managerial Entrenchment: The Corporate Governance Failure in Anglo-Irish Bank","authors":"Gary Abrahams, Joanne Horton, Yuval Millo","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2955610","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2955610","url":null,"abstract":"What are the dynamics through which corporate boards led by dominant CEOs fail? We address this question by examining the case of Anglo Irish Bank. We focus on the dynamics in and around Anglo’s board of directors in the 3-year period leading to its collapse in 2008. Using documentary analysis and 21 interviews with Anglo’s senior managers and other key actors, we identify two interrelated sets of dynamics: a dominant CEO who used his influence to populate the board with affiliated individuals, leading to a low-skilled board and increasing further his dominance; and the establishment of norms whereby stock ownership signified loyalty rather than commitment to performance. We suggest these dynamics reflect a broader organisational change where new meanings were assigned to existing corporate practices, leading to poor scrutiny of executive decisions and subversion of intended incentives. Our findings contribute to the literature on managerial entrenchment by shedding light on how undesirable consequences of stock ownership are likely to emerge. More generally, we contribute to the management and corporate governance literatures by showing the dynamic and interdependent nature of factors that contribute to the emergence of organisational vulnerabilities and ultimately to corporate failures.","PeriodicalId":265444,"journal":{"name":"CGN: Other Corporate Governance: Economic Consequences","volume":"8 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-04-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129119388","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We are making available to all scholars a new dataset on legal protections of minority shareholder rights with repeated annual measures between 1970 and 2011 for 78 countries. Our measure synthesizes 10 different legal provisions contained in national legislation. The data can be used to analyze research topics regarding corporate governance, financial development, stock markets, joint ventures, and other types of managerial and governance issues.
{"title":"A New and Free Longitudinal and Cross-National Dataset on Minority Shareholder Protections","authors":"M. Guillén, L. Capron","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2644905","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2644905","url":null,"abstract":"We are making available to all scholars a new dataset on legal protections of minority shareholder rights with repeated annual measures between 1970 and 2011 for 78 countries. Our measure synthesizes 10 different legal provisions contained in national legislation. The data can be used to analyze research topics regarding corporate governance, financial development, stock markets, joint ventures, and other types of managerial and governance issues.","PeriodicalId":265444,"journal":{"name":"CGN: Other Corporate Governance: Economic Consequences","volume":"226 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-09-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128554829","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2014-03-30DOI: 10.1093/OXFORDHB/9780198743682.013.33
M. Pargendler
Despite deep differences in their political systems, legal regimes, and economic structures, countries such as Brazil, Russia, India, and China share a recent history of rapid economic growth and capital market expansion. This chapter for the forthcoming Oxford Handbook of Corporate Law and Governance (Jeffrey N. Gordon & Wolf-Georg Ringe eds.) explores the degree and direction of transformation in emerging markets’ corporate governance in the last decades. Part I surveys the interaction between the ownership structures prevailing in emerging markets and the underlying institutional environment. Part II examines the driving forces of change by comparing the relative roles played by legislatures, regulators, courts, and alternative institutional arrangements in corporate governance reform. Part III then evaluates the degree of convergence and persistence in corporate governance in emerging markets by underscoring the need to consider the particular contextual significance of different practices.
尽管巴西、俄罗斯、印度和中国等国在政治制度、法律制度和经济结构上存在着深刻的差异，但它们都经历了经济快速增长和资本市场扩张的历史。即将出版的《牛津公司法与治理手册》(Jeffrey N. Gordon & Wolf-Georg Ringe主编)的这一章探讨了过去几十年新兴市场公司治理转型的程度和方向。第一部分考察了新兴市场中普遍存在的所有权结构与潜在制度环境之间的相互作用。第二部分通过比较立法机构、监管机构、法院和其他制度安排在公司治理改革中所扮演的相对角色来考察变革的驱动力。然后，第三部分通过强调考虑不同实践的特定背景意义的必要性，评估了新兴市场公司治理的趋同程度和持久性。
{"title":"Corporate governance in emerging markets","authors":"M. Pargendler","doi":"10.1093/OXFORDHB/9780198743682.013.33","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/OXFORDHB/9780198743682.013.33","url":null,"abstract":"Despite deep differences in their political systems, legal regimes, and economic structures, countries such as Brazil, Russia, India, and China share a recent history of rapid economic growth and capital market expansion. This chapter for the forthcoming Oxford Handbook of Corporate Law and Governance (Jeffrey N. Gordon & Wolf-Georg Ringe eds.) explores the degree and direction of transformation in emerging markets’ corporate governance in the last decades. Part I surveys the interaction between the ownership structures prevailing in emerging markets and the underlying institutional environment. Part II examines the driving forces of change by comparing the relative roles played by legislatures, regulators, courts, and alternative institutional arrangements in corporate governance reform. Part III then evaluates the degree of convergence and persistence in corporate governance in emerging markets by underscoring the need to consider the particular contextual significance of different practices.","PeriodicalId":265444,"journal":{"name":"CGN: Other Corporate Governance: Economic Consequences","volume":"75 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-03-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127617826","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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