尼泊尔森林碳供应:来自选择实验的证据

S. Dissanayake, R. Bluffstone, E. Somanathan, H. Luintel, N. Paudel, M. Toman
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引用次数: 0

摘要

本文利用2013年在尼泊尔进行的一项选择实验,估计了家庭层面参与“减少毁林和森林退化排放倡议”下的村级项目的意愿,该项目要求减少薪柴收集,并将其作为每单位避免二氧化碳排放所支付的价格的函数。该分析考察了参与有正式社区森林管理的村庄(实施减少毁林和森林退化造成的排放的核心机构)和只有非正式森林用户群体的村庄的动机。与先前文献中关于参与激励的研究结果相反,但与最近尼泊尔关于减少毁林和森林退化导致的排放试点的其他研究一致,本研究发现,在每吨避免碳排放的价格为1美元至5美元时,减少的排放量相对较少。正式的社区森林几乎肯定会成为尼泊尔以及其他国家实施减少毁林和森林退化造成的排放的核心机构。研究发现,正式森林用户群体为达成减少薪材收集的协议所需支付的平均值和中位数要比非正式社区大得多。这反映了正式群体可能已经有了薪材收集限制,而非正式群体实际上可能允许开放开采。分析还表明,作为非正式群体一部分的家庭对减少毁林和森林退化造成的排放的反应与作为正式群体成员的家庭非常不同。一般来说,“弱势”正式群体成员家庭,如无地、女户主和贫穷的家庭,似乎对收集薪材的限制更为谨慎,因此需要比一般受访者支付更高的款项。这种差异似乎不会延续到非正式群体成员身上。
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Forest Carbon Supply in Nepal: Evidence from a Choice Experiment
This paper uses a choice experiment conducted in Nepal during 2013 to estimate household-level willingness to participate in a village-level program under the Reduced Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation initiative requiring reductions in fuelwood collection, as a function of the price paid per unit of avoided carbon dioxide emissions. The analysis examines incentives to participate both in villages having formal community forest management, the core institution for implementing Reduced Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation, and villages having only informal forest user groups. Contrary to previous findings in the literature about participation incentives, but in keeping with other recent studies of Reduced Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation pilots in Nepal, this study finds that relatively little emission reduction would take place at prices of $1.00 to $5.00 per ton of avoided carbon emissions. Formal community forests will almost certainly be the core institution within which Reduced Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation is implemented in Nepal and likely other countries. The study finds that average and median values of payment required for agreement to reduce fuelwood collection are substantially larger for formal forest user groups than in informal communities. This reflects that formal groups likely already have fuelwood collection restrictions in place, whereas informal groups may de facto permit open access extraction. The analysis also suggests that households that are part of informal groups react to Reduced Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation very differently than households that are formal group members. Broadly speaking,"underprivileged"formal group member households, such as those who are landless, female-headed, and poor, appear to be warier of fuelwood collection restrictions and thus require higher payments than average respondents. This difference does not appear to carry over to informal group members.
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