法国的管理发明

B. Khan
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引用次数: 0

摘要

法国呈现出最接近于社会差异的“企业家国家”模式,包括集中式和分散式管理创新机构。学者们认为这些方法优于市场交易。然而,他们的不具代表性的案例研究低估或忽视了政治上有偏见的经济战略的成本,包括更大的不确定性、不正确的相对价格和资源分配不当,以及对创新活动投资的激励降低。一个建立在少数人特权基础上的社会,给精英和有人脉的人带来了不成比例的利益,损害了威胁现有利益的创造力,并鼓励寻租,而不是从满足市场需求中获得回报。
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Administered Invention in France
France presents the closest model of a soi-disant “entrepreneurial state,” including both centralized and decentralized administered innovation institutions. Scholars have argued that these approaches were superior to market transactions. However, their unrepresentative case studies have underestimated or ignored the costs of politically biased economic strategies, including greater uncertainty, incorrect relative prices and the misallocation of resources, and lower incentives for investments in inventive activity. A society based on special privileges for the few provided disproportionate benefits for elites and those with personal connections, disadvantaged creativity that threatened existing interests, and encouraged rent-seeking rather than returns from meeting market demand.
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