Pub Date : 2020-06-18DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780190936075.003.0008
B. Khan
The strongest case for administered innovation systems relies on government sponsorship of research and development and technological discoveries during World War II and the modern postwar era. The American Civil War provides a useful counterpoint that demonstrates the effectiveness of markets in ideas even during the severe disruptions of a devastating battle on domestic soil. The Civil War was characterized by a high degree of technological creativity for military-related inventions and innovations, to a far greater extent than during the twentieth century. Both the sourcing of new technologies and military procurement were decentralized and subject to market forces. The market incentives for private inventors to engage in trial-and-error experimentation created an impressive portfolio of radical new technologies from which military leaders chose the most appropriate to support their strategies.
{"title":"“Creative Destruction”","authors":"B. Khan","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780190936075.003.0008","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190936075.003.0008","url":null,"abstract":"The strongest case for administered innovation systems relies on government sponsorship of research and development and technological discoveries during World War II and the modern postwar era. The American Civil War provides a useful counterpoint that demonstrates the effectiveness of markets in ideas even during the severe disruptions of a devastating battle on domestic soil. The Civil War was characterized by a high degree of technological creativity for military-related inventions and innovations, to a far greater extent than during the twentieth century. Both the sourcing of new technologies and military procurement were decentralized and subject to market forces. The market incentives for private inventors to engage in trial-and-error experimentation created an impressive portfolio of radical new technologies from which military leaders chose the most appropriate to support their strategies.","PeriodicalId":423757,"journal":{"name":"Inventing Ideas","volume":"28 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-06-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123895794","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-06-18DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780190936075.003.0006
B. Khan
France presents the closest model of a soi-disant “entrepreneurial state,” including both centralized and decentralized administered innovation institutions. Scholars have argued that these approaches were superior to market transactions. However, their unrepresentative case studies have underestimated or ignored the costs of politically biased economic strategies, including greater uncertainty, incorrect relative prices and the misallocation of resources, and lower incentives for investments in inventive activity. A society based on special privileges for the few provided disproportionate benefits for elites and those with personal connections, disadvantaged creativity that threatened existing interests, and encouraged rent-seeking rather than returns from meeting market demand.
{"title":"Administered Invention in France","authors":"B. Khan","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780190936075.003.0006","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190936075.003.0006","url":null,"abstract":"France presents the closest model of a soi-disant “entrepreneurial state,” including both centralized and decentralized administered innovation institutions. Scholars have argued that these approaches were superior to market transactions. However, their unrepresentative case studies have underestimated or ignored the costs of politically biased economic strategies, including greater uncertainty, incorrect relative prices and the misallocation of resources, and lower incentives for investments in inventive activity. A society based on special privileges for the few provided disproportionate benefits for elites and those with personal connections, disadvantaged creativity that threatened existing interests, and encouraged rent-seeking rather than returns from meeting market demand.","PeriodicalId":423757,"journal":{"name":"Inventing Ideas","volume":"30 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-06-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129125405","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-06-18DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780190936075.003.0003
B. Khan
Academics and policymakers alike tend to motivate their claims about innovation prizes with a cluster of popular, but previously unexamined, historical anecdotes. As a result, canonical case studies like the award for gauging longitude at sea, the success of efforts to induce new methods of food preservation in France, and “Daguerrotype patent buyouts” have had a disproportionate effect on our understanding of institutions and incentives for inventive activity. Closer attention to the specific details derived from the primary records reveals key misapprehensions and inaccuracies, implying that the oft-recited conclusions about technological prizes are largely misleading.
{"title":"Inventing Prizes","authors":"B. Khan","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780190936075.003.0003","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190936075.003.0003","url":null,"abstract":"Academics and policymakers alike tend to motivate their claims about innovation prizes with a cluster of popular, but previously unexamined, historical anecdotes. As a result, canonical case studies like the award for gauging longitude at sea, the success of efforts to induce new methods of food preservation in France, and “Daguerrotype patent buyouts” have had a disproportionate effect on our understanding of institutions and incentives for inventive activity. Closer attention to the specific details derived from the primary records reveals key misapprehensions and inaccuracies, implying that the oft-recited conclusions about technological prizes are largely misleading.","PeriodicalId":423757,"journal":{"name":"Inventing Ideas","volume":"55 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-06-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126753535","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-06-18DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780190936075.003.0005
B. Khan
The Royal Society of Arts offered honorary and cash awards for creativity. The society initially was averse to patents and prohibited the award of prizes for patented inventions. Inventors of items that were valuable in the marketplace typically chose to obtain patents and to bypass the prize system. Owing to such adverse selection, prizes were negatively related to subsequent areas of important technological discovery. The society acknowledged that its efforts had been “futile” because of its hostility to patents and switched from offering inducement prizes toward lobbying for reforms to strengthen the patent system. The findings suggest some skepticism is warranted about claims that elites and non-market-oriented institutions generated technological innovation and long-term economic development.
英国皇家艺术学会(Royal Society of Arts)为创造力提供了荣誉奖和现金奖。该协会最初反对专利，并禁止为专利发明颁发奖金。在市场上有价值的产品的发明者通常会选择获得专利，绕过奖励制度。由于这种逆向选择，奖项与随后的重要技术发现领域负相关。该协会承认，由于其对专利的敌意，它的努力是“徒劳的”，并从提供诱导奖转向游说改革，以加强专利制度。研究结果表明，对于精英和非市场导向机构产生技术创新和长期经济发展的说法，有必要提出一些质疑。
{"title":"Prestige and Profit","authors":"B. Khan","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780190936075.003.0005","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190936075.003.0005","url":null,"abstract":"The Royal Society of Arts offered honorary and cash awards for creativity. The society initially was averse to patents and prohibited the award of prizes for patented inventions. Inventors of items that were valuable in the marketplace typically chose to obtain patents and to bypass the prize system. Owing to such adverse selection, prizes were negatively related to subsequent areas of important technological discovery. The society acknowledged that its efforts had been “futile” because of its hostility to patents and switched from offering inducement prizes toward lobbying for reforms to strengthen the patent system. The findings suggest some skepticism is warranted about claims that elites and non-market-oriented institutions generated technological innovation and long-term economic development.","PeriodicalId":423757,"journal":{"name":"Inventing Ideas","volume":"205 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-06-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122582748","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-06-18DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780190936075.003.0002
B. Khan
The “patent controversy” of the twenty-first century reflects claims that patent institutions are in crisis, and new developments in technology markets require departures from traditional approaches to property rights. The historical record sheds light on the nature and validity of these assertions. Patterns over the course of two centuries regarding patent grants, litigation rates, and intermediaries or “nonpracticing entities” suggest that these features of the market for ideas are hardly anomalous. Indeed, they have always been characteristic of the disruptive technologies that propelled the United States toward global industrial leadership.
{"title":"Trolls and Other Patent Inventions","authors":"B. Khan","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780190936075.003.0002","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190936075.003.0002","url":null,"abstract":"The “patent controversy” of the twenty-first century reflects claims that patent institutions are in crisis, and new developments in technology markets require departures from traditional approaches to property rights. The historical record sheds light on the nature and validity of these assertions. Patterns over the course of two centuries regarding patent grants, litigation rates, and intermediaries or “nonpracticing entities” suggest that these features of the market for ideas are hardly anomalous. Indeed, they have always been characteristic of the disruptive technologies that propelled the United States toward global industrial leadership.","PeriodicalId":423757,"journal":{"name":"Inventing Ideas","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-06-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128495078","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-06-18DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780190936075.003.0010
B. Khan
This study of over 12,000 women inventors in Britain, France, and America reveals new insights about gender and creativity, and about incentives and institutions for innovation. Women tended to specialize in improvements of consumer final goods, the look and feel of existing items, and design-oriented products at the boundaries of art and technology. While their creativity was often directed toward improving family welfare within the household, many of their contributions proved to be valuable in the market for inventions. Family firms provided an important conduit that overcame social obstacles to their entrepreneurial efforts. By contrast, women were significantly less likely to be awarded prizes for their innovations, so it is not surprising that they typically opted not to participate in administered systems.
{"title":"Designing Women","authors":"B. Khan","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780190936075.003.0010","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190936075.003.0010","url":null,"abstract":"This study of over 12,000 women inventors in Britain, France, and America reveals new insights about gender and creativity, and about incentives and institutions for innovation. Women tended to specialize in improvements of consumer final goods, the look and feel of existing items, and design-oriented products at the boundaries of art and technology. While their creativity was often directed toward improving family welfare within the household, many of their contributions proved to be valuable in the market for inventions. Family firms provided an important conduit that overcame social obstacles to their entrepreneurial efforts. By contrast, women were significantly less likely to be awarded prizes for their innovations, so it is not surprising that they typically opted not to participate in administered systems.","PeriodicalId":423757,"journal":{"name":"Inventing Ideas","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-06-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130423448","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-06-18DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780190936075.003.0013
B. Khan
Selective case studies of the post–World War II economy have given rise to claims that national innovation systems, or dirigiste linkages between the state, universities, and industry, are required for technological change and economic growth. The long-run patterns of innovation in the leading nations of Britain, France, and the United States suggest otherwise. Administered systems, where key economic decisions were made by elites, the state, and other privileged groups, typically were associated with monopsonies and the misallocation of resources and talent. By contrast, the American experience highlights the central role of markets in ideas and decentralized incentives for innovation, in concert with flexible open-access adjacent institutions, in promoting useful knowledge and sustained technological progress.
{"title":"National Innovation Systems and Innovation in Nations","authors":"B. Khan","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780190936075.003.0013","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190936075.003.0013","url":null,"abstract":"Selective case studies of the post–World War II economy have given rise to claims that national innovation systems, or dirigiste linkages between the state, universities, and industry, are required for technological change and economic growth. The long-run patterns of innovation in the leading nations of Britain, France, and the United States suggest otherwise. Administered systems, where key economic decisions were made by elites, the state, and other privileged groups, typically were associated with monopsonies and the misallocation of resources and talent. By contrast, the American experience highlights the central role of markets in ideas and decentralized incentives for innovation, in concert with flexible open-access adjacent institutions, in promoting useful knowledge and sustained technological progress.","PeriodicalId":423757,"journal":{"name":"Inventing Ideas","volume":"9 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-06-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129556472","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-06-18DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780190936075.003.0007
B. Khan
Innovation prizes were regularly sponsored by the Franklin Institute and other mechanics’ institutes throughout the United States. The analysis shows that administered innovation systems in the United States demonstrated the same endemic characteristics as their European counterparts. Unlike the more democratic nature of patent markets, the judges, participants, and winners belonged to wealthier and more privileged classes. Prize systems failed to induce the desired outcomes, and the allocation of awards was typically idiosyncratic and unrelated to characteristics of the invention. Their administration was rife with poor governance, and the administrative costs often exceeded the amounts being disbursed to inventors. Rather than providing effective inducements for novel inventive activity, prizes primarily served as marketing and publicity mechanisms for firms that wished to commercialize already existing innovations.
{"title":"Going for Gold","authors":"B. Khan","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780190936075.003.0007","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190936075.003.0007","url":null,"abstract":"Innovation prizes were regularly sponsored by the Franklin Institute and other mechanics’ institutes throughout the United States. The analysis shows that administered innovation systems in the United States demonstrated the same endemic characteristics as their European counterparts. Unlike the more democratic nature of patent markets, the judges, participants, and winners belonged to wealthier and more privileged classes. Prize systems failed to induce the desired outcomes, and the allocation of awards was typically idiosyncratic and unrelated to characteristics of the invention. Their administration was rife with poor governance, and the administrative costs often exceeded the amounts being disbursed to inventors. Rather than providing effective inducements for novel inventive activity, prizes primarily served as marketing and publicity mechanisms for firms that wished to commercialize already existing innovations.","PeriodicalId":423757,"journal":{"name":"Inventing Ideas","volume":"35 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-06-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122457263","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-06-18DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780190936075.003.0014
B. Khan
The modern knowledge economy had its start in the United States when, for the first time in world history, an intellectual property clause was included in a national Constitution. This strong endorsement for property rights and decentralized markets in ideas reflected a revolution in thinking about the sources of creativity and economic progress, which conventional economic theories about innovation and growth have yet to fully capture. European administered innovation systems assumed that elites, scarce knowledge, and costly human capital inputs were the primary sources of useful ideas and productivity advances. Administered arrangements failed to induce inventions at appropriate prices, perpetuated errors because of a lack of monitoring and feedback, and were associated with rent-seeking and significant deadweight losses. By contrast, market-oriented policies in the United States generated increasing returns associated with its larger and more diverse population of inventors and useful ideas, which encouraged self-sustaining endogenous growth and a global technological advantage that has persisted for well over a century.
{"title":"Conclusion","authors":"B. Khan","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780190936075.003.0014","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190936075.003.0014","url":null,"abstract":"The modern knowledge economy had its start in the United States when, for the first time in world history, an intellectual property clause was included in a national Constitution. This strong endorsement for property rights and decentralized markets in ideas reflected a revolution in thinking about the sources of creativity and economic progress, which conventional economic theories about innovation and growth have yet to fully capture. European administered innovation systems assumed that elites, scarce knowledge, and costly human capital inputs were the primary sources of useful ideas and productivity advances. Administered arrangements failed to induce inventions at appropriate prices, perpetuated errors because of a lack of monitoring and feedback, and were associated with rent-seeking and significant deadweight losses. By contrast, market-oriented policies in the United States generated increasing returns associated with its larger and more diverse population of inventors and useful ideas, which encouraged self-sustaining endogenous growth and a global technological advantage that has persisted for well over a century.","PeriodicalId":423757,"journal":{"name":"Inventing Ideas","volume":"26 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-06-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134068804","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-06-18DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780190936075.003.0011
B. Khan
An extensive global market in patent rights and patented inventions helped creative men and women to increase their returns from inventive activity. Prominent multinational corporations further depended on portfolios of patents to acquire and maintain their domestic and worldwide competitive advantage. Markets in ideas aided the transfer of technology across the United States, Britain, Germany, Canada, Spain, and Japan. Patterns in the sale of patents and foreign patenting were responsive to national differences in incentives, legal rules, and institutions. The results shed light on central debates in economic development, including the net benefits of tailoring patent institutions to individual circumstances, relative to adherence to harmonized international standards.
{"title":"Selling Ideas","authors":"B. Khan","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780190936075.003.0011","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190936075.003.0011","url":null,"abstract":"An extensive global market in patent rights and patented inventions helped creative men and women to increase their returns from inventive activity. Prominent multinational corporations further depended on portfolios of patents to acquire and maintain their domestic and worldwide competitive advantage. Markets in ideas aided the transfer of technology across the United States, Britain, Germany, Canada, Spain, and Japan. Patterns in the sale of patents and foreign patenting were responsive to national differences in incentives, legal rules, and institutions. The results shed light on central debates in economic development, including the net benefits of tailoring patent institutions to individual circumstances, relative to adherence to harmonized international standards.","PeriodicalId":423757,"journal":{"name":"Inventing Ideas","volume":"14 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-06-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132894127","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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