{"title":"机构设计的几何方法","authors":"J. Goeree, Alexey Kushnir","doi":"10.1086/721806","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Applying basic techniques from convex analysis and majorization theory we develop a novel approach to mechanism design that is geometric in nature. This geometric approach provides a simple and unified treatment of the optimal mechanisms for general social choice problems with arbitrary linear objectives, including revenue and welfare maximization. We further present applications and extensions to nonlinear objectives.","PeriodicalId":289840,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Political Economy Microeconomics","volume":"71 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2013-06-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"17","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"A Geometric Approach to Mechanism Design\",\"authors\":\"J. Goeree, Alexey Kushnir\",\"doi\":\"10.1086/721806\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"Applying basic techniques from convex analysis and majorization theory we develop a novel approach to mechanism design that is geometric in nature. This geometric approach provides a simple and unified treatment of the optimal mechanisms for general social choice problems with arbitrary linear objectives, including revenue and welfare maximization. We further present applications and extensions to nonlinear objectives.\",\"PeriodicalId\":289840,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Journal of Political Economy Microeconomics\",\"volume\":\"71 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2013-06-05\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"17\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Journal of Political Economy Microeconomics\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1086/721806\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Journal of Political Economy Microeconomics","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1086/721806","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
Applying basic techniques from convex analysis and majorization theory we develop a novel approach to mechanism design that is geometric in nature. This geometric approach provides a simple and unified treatment of the optimal mechanisms for general social choice problems with arbitrary linear objectives, including revenue and welfare maximization. We further present applications and extensions to nonlinear objectives.
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