SiCBit-PUF:用于可信soc的强缓存内位翻转PUF计算

Athanasios Xynos, V. Tenentes, Y. Tsiatouhas
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引用次数: 0

摘要

安全计算需要将硬件信任根(RoT)集成到片上系统(soc)中,用于加密密钥生成、认证和识别。在本文中,我们观察到,当从同一位线访问多个单元时出现的SRAM单元中的位翻转不是随机的,而是系统的。基于这一观察,提出了一种新的强内存物理不可克隆函数(PUF)计算方法,用于从SRAM阵列中获取静态熵。所提出的设计与现有的in-SRAM计算架构兼容。为了验证我们的PUF操作,我们实现了一个使用32纳米CMOS技术执行内存计算的6T SRAM阵列模型,并通过SPICE模拟评估了我们提出的PUF性能。所提出的PUF运行的唯一性和均匀性分别达到49.99%和49.74%,当温度在0 ~ 100℃范围内变化时,可靠性高于97.4%,当标称电压电源变化10%时,可靠性高于95.2%。此外,我们探讨了提出的PUF的挑战响应对(CRPs)数量的缩放,并将其与最先进的技术进行了比较。我们的PUF提供了更高数量级的crp数量,因此它适用于确保soc中安全计算的集成机制。
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SiCBit-PUF: Strong in-Cache Bitflip PUF Computation for Trusted SoCs
Secure computing necessitates hardware root of trust (RoT) integrated in Systems-on-Chips (SoCs) for cryptographic keys generation, authentication and identification. In this paper, we observe that bitflips in SRAM cells that appear while accessing multiple cells from the same bitline, are not stochastic, as previously considered, but systematic. Based on this observation, a novel strong in-memory Physical Unclonable Function (PUF) computation is proposed for harvesting static entropy from SRAM arrays. The proposed design is compatible with existing in-SRAM computing architectures. To verify our PUF operation, we implement a 6T SRAM array model that performs in-memory computing using a 32 nm CMOS Technology, and, through SPICE simulation, we evaluate the proposed PUF performance. The proposed PUF operation achieves uniqueness and uniformity of 49.99%, and 49.74%, respectively, and reliability higher than 97.4% when the temperature is varied from 0°C to 100°C, and higher than 95.2% when the nominal voltage supply is varied by 10%. Furthermore, we explore the scaling of the number of Challenge Response Pairs (CRPs) of the proposed PUF, and we compare it against the state-of-the-art. Our PUF offers orders of magnitude higher number of CRPs, therefore it is suitable for integrated mechanisms that assure secure computing in SoCs.
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