Fully Homomorphic Encryption without Squashing Using Depth-3 Arithmetic Circuits

All previously known fully homomorphic encryption (FHE) schemes use Gentry's blueprint:* SWHE: Construct a somewhat homomorphic encryption (SWHE) scheme -- roughly, an encryption scheme that can homomorphically evaluate polynomials up to some degree.* Squash: ``Squash" the decryption function of the SWHE scheme, so that the scheme can evaluate functions twice as complex (in terms of polynomial degree) than its own decryption function. Do this by adding a ``hint " to the SHWE public key -- namely, a large set of vectors that has a secret sparse subset that sums to the original secret key.* Bootstrap: Given a SWHE scheme that can evaluate functions twice as complex as its decryption function, apply Gentry's transformation to get a ``leveled" FHE scheme. To get ``pure" (non-leveled) FHE, one assumes circular security. Here, we describe a new blueprint for FHE. We show how to eliminate the squashing step, and thereby eliminate the need to assume that the sparse subset sum problem (SSSP) is hard, as all previous leveled FHE schemes have done. Using our new blueprint, we obtain the following results:* A ``simple" leveled FHE scheme where we replace SSSP with Decision Diffie-Hellman!* The first leveled FHE scheme based entirely on worst-case hardness}. Specifically, we give a leveled FHE scheme with security based on the shortest independent vector problem over ideal lattices (ideal-SIVP).* Some efficiency improvements for FHE.} While the new blueprint does not yet improve computational efficiency, it reduces cipher text length. As in the previous blueprint, we obtain pure FHE by assuming circular security. Our main technique is to express the decryption function of SWHE schemes as a depth-3 ($\sum \prod \sum$) arithmetic circuit. When we evaluate this decryption function homomorphically, we temporarily switch to a multiplicatively homomorphic encryption (MHE) scheme, such as Elgamal, to handle the $\prod$ part, after which we translate the result from the MHE scheme back to the SWHE scheme by evaluating the MHE scheme's decryption function within the SWHE scheme. The SWHE scheme only needs to be able to evaluate the MHE scheme's decryption function (plus minor operations), and does not need to have the self-referential property of being able to evaluate its {\em own} decryption function, a property that necessitated squashing in the original blueprint.