偏见罪与危害人类罪:语境中的罪责

A. Danner
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引用次数: 10

摘要

在威斯康辛诉米切尔案(Wisconsin v. Mitchell)发生九年后,偏见犯罪法规已成为美国法律界的一个固定特征。然而,从哲学的角度来看,这些法规仍然只是部分地被理解。最被广泛接受的与偏见犯罪法规相关的加刑理由是,有证据表明,这些犯罪可能比“普通”犯罪造成更大的伤害。然而,学者们没有那么成功地阐明,偏见犯罪者的特殊罪责,证明了他的个人罪责,从而加强了对他的惩罚。对与偏见犯罪相关的罪责的主要解释源于一种信念,即犯罪者的动机尤其应该受到谴责。相比之下,在本文中,我认为犯罪者选择特定受害者的决定——而不一定是他的动机——是与道德相关的事件,也是我们可以公正地施加更多惩罚的基础。对与偏见犯罪有关的罪责的传统解释由于未能充分考虑这些犯罪的群体方面而受到影响。国际法规定的危害人类罪为我们审视偏见罪提供了一个有用的棱镜。通过与反人类罪的比较,我认为只有通过回顾犯罪者行为的社会背景以及他对该背景的理解,才能理解偏见犯罪人的罪责。特别重要的是要考虑犯罪者对其受害者所属群体所受歧视的理解。我坚持认为,如果犯罪者故意选择受害者是社会中遭受歧视的群体中的一员,并且他对这种歧视至少是不顾后果的,那么他应该为这种歧视做出贡献,从而犯了偏见罪。在这些条件下,偏见犯罪者的行为强化和延续了促进和固化现有歧视的社会意义。他有意识地选择弱势群体中的一员作为他的受害者,这使得犯罪者更应该受到谴责:他故意或不顾后果地加入其他不法分子的行列,表现出偏见和歧视,最终损害了我们的社会。
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Bias Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity: Culpability in Context
Nine years after Wisconsin v. Mitchell, bias crime statutes have become a settled feature of the American legal landscape. In philosophical terms, however, these statutes remain only partially understood. The most widely accepted justification for the penalty enhancement associated with bias crime statutes derives from evidence that these crimes potentially engender more harm than do "ordinary" crimes. Scholars have less successfully articulated, however, the special blameworthiness of the bias crime perpetrator that justifies his enhanced punishment on the grounds of his personal culpability. The dominant account of the culpability associated with bias crimes derives from a conviction that the perpetrator's motives are particularly culpable. In this article, by contrast, I argue that the perpetrator's decision to select a particular victim - and not necessarily his motive - is the morally relevant event, and the basis upon which we may justly inflict increased punishment. Traditional explanations of the culpability associated with bias crimes suffer from a failure to consider fully the group aspects of these crimes. Crimes against humanity under international law provide a useful prism through which we can examine bias crimes. Through a comparison with crimes against humanity, I argue that the bias crime perpetrator's culpability can only be understood by reviewing the social context in which the perpetrator acts and his understanding of that context. In particular, it is important to consider the perpetrator's understanding of discrimination against the group of which his victim is a member. I maintain that a perpetrator should be found culpable for contributing to this discrimination - and hence guilty of a bias crime - if he intentionally selects a victim who is a member of a group subject to discrimination in the community, and if he is at least reckless as to that discrimination. Under these conditions, the bias crime perpetrator's actions reinforce and perpetuate social meanings that facilitate and solidify existing discrimination. His conscious decision to select a member of a vulnerable group as his victim makes the perpetrator more blameworthy: he knowingly or recklessly joins other wrongdoers in a demonstration of bias and discrimination that ultimately harms our society.
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