{"title":"脚印轻,战争长","authors":"Christopher D. Kolenda","doi":"10.5810/kentucky/9780813152769.003.0005","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"This chapter discusses U.S. planning and assumptions before the invasion of Afghanistan. The Bush administration, with President Bush’s dislike of nation-building, Defense Secretary Rumsfeld’s preference for light, technological solutions, and the idea that Afghanistan was only one of many fronts of the Global War on Terrorism, opted for a limited military footprint and aimed to exit as quickly as possible. A contradiction ensued between a decisive victory outcome and the minimalist ways and means devoted to it.","PeriodicalId":235305,"journal":{"name":"Zero-Sum Victory","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2021-10-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Light Footprints to a Long War\",\"authors\":\"Christopher D. Kolenda\",\"doi\":\"10.5810/kentucky/9780813152769.003.0005\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"This chapter discusses U.S. planning and assumptions before the invasion of Afghanistan. The Bush administration, with President Bush’s dislike of nation-building, Defense Secretary Rumsfeld’s preference for light, technological solutions, and the idea that Afghanistan was only one of many fronts of the Global War on Terrorism, opted for a limited military footprint and aimed to exit as quickly as possible. A contradiction ensued between a decisive victory outcome and the minimalist ways and means devoted to it.\",\"PeriodicalId\":235305,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Zero-Sum Victory\",\"volume\":null,\"pages\":null},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2021-10-26\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Zero-Sum Victory\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.5810/kentucky/9780813152769.003.0005\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Zero-Sum Victory","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.5810/kentucky/9780813152769.003.0005","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
This chapter discusses U.S. planning and assumptions before the invasion of Afghanistan. The Bush administration, with President Bush’s dislike of nation-building, Defense Secretary Rumsfeld’s preference for light, technological solutions, and the idea that Afghanistan was only one of many fronts of the Global War on Terrorism, opted for a limited military footprint and aimed to exit as quickly as possible. A contradiction ensued between a decisive victory outcome and the minimalist ways and means devoted to it.