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引用次数: 0

摘要

本章最后提请注意康德早期批评者(包括卡尔·莱因霍尔德、伦纳德·克鲁泽和所罗门·迈蒙)与当今康德主义者之间的相似之处。令人惊讶的是,这一章表明,这些当代的论点,无论是在精神上还是在策略上,都更接近于那些声称要修改或拒绝康德立场的第一批后康德主义者。两者都试图从更基本的行为、能动性或理性的概念中推导出道德要求的规范性。在阅读康德在本书中的辩护时,康德本人在其成熟的著作中从未被这种基础主义的辩护策略所吸引。本章最后提出,康德抵制伦理学基础主义的理由,使我们有理由批判性地重新评估康德最近关于道德规范性的论点。
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Conclusion
This chapter concludes by drawing attention to a parallel between Kant’s early critics (including Karl Reinhold, Leonard Creuzer, and Solomon Maimon) and present-day Kantians. Surprisingly, the chapter shows that these contemporary arguments are closer, both in spirit and strategy, to those first post-Kantians who claimed to be revising or rejecting Kant’s position. Both seek to derive the normativity of moral requirements from a more basic conception of action, agency, or rationality. On the reading of Kant defended in this book, Kant himself was never attracted to such a foundationalist strategy of justification in his mature writings. The chapter concludes by suggesting that Kant’s reasons for resisting foundationalism in ethics give us reasons to critically reassess recent Kantian arguments for moral normativity.
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