垄断、价格歧视与隐私:隐藏的隐性成本

ERN: Monopoly Pub Date : 2015-10-15 DOI:10.2139/ssrn.2699085
Paul Belleflamme
{"title":"垄断、价格歧视与隐私:隐藏的隐性成本","authors":"Paul Belleflamme","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2699085","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"A monopolist can use a ‘tracking’ technology to identify a consumer’s willingness to pay with some probability. Consumers can counteract tracking by acquiring a ‘hiding’ technology. We show that consumers may be collectively better off absent this hiding technology.","PeriodicalId":142139,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Monopoly","volume":"18 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2015-10-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"65","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Monopoly Price Discrimination and Privacy: The Hidden Cost of Hiding\",\"authors\":\"Paul Belleflamme\",\"doi\":\"10.2139/ssrn.2699085\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"A monopolist can use a ‘tracking’ technology to identify a consumer’s willingness to pay with some probability. Consumers can counteract tracking by acquiring a ‘hiding’ technology. We show that consumers may be collectively better off absent this hiding technology.\",\"PeriodicalId\":142139,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"ERN: Monopoly\",\"volume\":\"18 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2015-10-15\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"65\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"ERN: Monopoly\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2699085\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"ERN: Monopoly","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2699085","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 65

摘要

垄断者可以使用“跟踪”技术来确定消费者在某种可能性下的支付意愿。消费者可以通过购买“隐藏”技术来抵制跟踪。我们表明,如果没有这种隐藏技术,消费者整体上可能会过得更好。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
查看原文
分享 分享
微信好友 朋友圈 QQ好友 复制链接
本刊更多论文
Monopoly Price Discrimination and Privacy: The Hidden Cost of Hiding
A monopolist can use a ‘tracking’ technology to identify a consumer’s willingness to pay with some probability. Consumers can counteract tracking by acquiring a ‘hiding’ technology. We show that consumers may be collectively better off absent this hiding technology.
求助全文
通过发布文献求助,成功后即可免费获取论文全文。 去求助
来源期刊
自引率
0.00%
发文量
0
期刊最新文献
A Collective Agreement is Not Inherently Anti Competitive in Japan: Trade Unions, Self-Employed Workers and the Antimonopoly Act The Cost and Benefit of Dynamic Pricing Does Local Competition and Firm Market Power Affect Investment Adviser Misconduct? Monopoly Pricing, Optimal Randomization and Resale Divide and Conquer in Two-Sided Markets: A Potential-Game Approach
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
现在去查看 取消
×
提示
确定
0
微信
客服QQ
Book学术公众号 扫码关注我们
反馈
×
意见反馈
请填写您的意见或建议
请填写您的手机或邮箱
已复制链接
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
×
扫码分享
扫码分享
Book学术官方微信
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:481959085
Book学术
文献互助 智能选刊 最新文献 互助须知 联系我们:info@booksci.cn
Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。
Copyright © 2023 Book学术 All rights reserved.
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号 京ICP备2023020795号-1