家庭路由器中流注入攻击的实践与防范

Steven Myers, Sid Stamm
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引用次数: 5

摘要

家用路由器的漏洞已经被广泛讨论,但在许多方面,人们对使用它们进行破坏性攻击的可行性持严重怀疑态度。另一些人则认为,传统的恶意软件防护技术仍将适用于路由器。在本文中,我们展示了如何轻松有效地将家用路由器重新用于执行中流脚本注入攻击。这种攻击透明且不加区分地从任意(非加密)网站窃取用户输入的表单数据,包括用户名和密码。此外,攻击可以持续很长一段时间,影响大量站点上的用户,允许一个攻击者很容易地将用户信息关联起来。脚本注入攻击是通过放置在不安全的家庭路由器上的恶意软件在客户端和服务器之间执行的。我们在一个常用的家用路由器上实施了攻击,以证明其可实现性和潜力。接下来,我们提出并实现有效的对策来阻止或防止我们的攻击和其他Web目标脚本注入攻击。对策是一种基于混淆和加密散列的短期防篡改形式。它利用了Web脚本是按需交付和解释的这一事实。他们不是完全阻止攻击的可能性,而是简单地提高攻击的成本,使其无利可图,从而从一开始就消除了攻击的动机。这些对策是健壮的,并且实际上是可部署的:它们允许缓存,部署在服务器端,但将大部分计算工作推给了客户机。此外,这些对策不需要修改浏览器或互联网标准。此外,它们不需要加密证书或频繁的昂贵加密操作,这是在许多中小型企业运行的web服务器上正确部署SSL的绊脚石。
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Practice & prevention of home-router mid-stream injection attacks
The vulnerability of home routers has been widely discussed, but there has been significant skepticism in many quarters about the viability of using them to perform damaging attacks. Others have argued that traditional malware prevention technologies will function for routers. In this paper we show how easily and effectively a home router can be repurposed to perform a mid-stream script injection attack. This attack transparently and indiscriminately siphons off many cases of user entered form-data from arbitrary (non-encrypted) Web-sites, including usernames and passwords. Additionally, the attack can take place over a long period of time affecting the user at a large number of sites allowing a userpsilas information to be easily correlated by one attacker. The script injection attack is performed through malware placed on an insecure home router, between the client and server. We implemented the attack on a commonly deployed home router to demonstrate its realizability and potential. Next, we propose and implement efficient countermeasures to discourage or prevent both our attack and other Web targeted script injection attacks. The countermeasures are a form of short-term tamper-prevention based on obfuscation and cryptographic hashing. It takes advantage of the fact that Web scripts are both delivered and interpreted on demand. Rather than preventing the possibility of attack altogether, they simply raise the cost of the attack to make it non-profitable thus removing the incentive to attack in the first place. These countermeasures are robust and practically deployable: they permit caching, are deployed server-side, but push most of the computational effort to the client. Further, the countermeasures do not require the modification of browsers or Internet standards. Further, they do not require cryptographic certificates or frequent expensive cryptographic operations, a stumbling block for the proper deployment of SSL on many Web-servers run by small to medium-sized businesses.
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