用单项否决权维持更高的税收和更多的支出:刺痛的罕见事件

J. Douglas
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引用次数: 1

摘要

学术文献几乎没有证据表明,美国各州的州长有效地使用了项目否决权来减少预算总额或缩小政府规模。通过对4个州的5位州长的行为进行考察,本研究表明,在一些情况下,项目否决权被明确用于维持较高的税收和支出水平。它的结论是,在适当的条件下,在关键时刻,州长可以使用单项否决权对州预算结果产生决定性影响。
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Maintaining Higher Taxes and Spending More with the Line‐Item Veto: Uncommon Events that Sting
The scholarly literature provides little evidence that the line‐item veto is used effectively by governors in the U.S. states to reduce budget totals or shrink the size of government. By examining the actions of five governors in four states, this study reveals that item vetoes have been used explicitly in several cases to maintain higher levels of taxation and spending. It concludes that under the right conditions at key moments in time the line item veto can be used by governors to have a decisive impact on state budget outcomes.
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