最优银行出资与家庭风险规避

S. Papageorgiou
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引用次数: 0

摘要

我们研究了在一般均衡环境下,银行介于厌恶风险的家庭和国家或有投资之间的银行捐款,这些银行事先为政府担保提供资金,并得到财政支持。我们提供了最优银行捐款的分析特征,作为家庭风险规避和担保的函数。为了证明较高的风险厌恶加速了银行出资内部化担保对家庭风险承担的促进作用,我们建立了最优银行出资与家庭风险厌恶之间的非平凡关系:当担保超过阈值时,较高的风险厌恶最优地诱导更高的出资;否则,在家庭风险厌恶程度较低的经济体中,应观察到更高的贡献。
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Optimal Bank Contributions and Household Risk-Aversion
We study bank contributions that ex ante fund government guarantees supported by a fiscal backstop in a general equilibrium setting where banks intermediate between risk-averse households and state-contingent investments. We offer an analytical characterization of optimal bank contributions as a function of household risk-aversion and guarantees. Showing that higher risk-aversion expedites the way bank contributions internalize guarantees' boost of household risk-taking, we establish a non-trivial relationship between optimal bank contributions and household risk-aversion: Higher risk-aversion optimally induces higher contributions when guarantees exceed a threshold; otherwise, higher contributions shall be observed in economies with less risk-averse households.
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