{"title":"最优银行出资与家庭风险规避","authors":"S. Papageorgiou","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3889332","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"We study bank contributions that ex ante fund government guarantees supported by a fiscal backstop in a general equilibrium setting where banks intermediate between risk-averse households and state-contingent investments. We offer an analytical characterization of optimal bank contributions as a function of household risk-aversion and guarantees. Showing that higher risk-aversion expedites the way bank contributions internalize guarantees' boost of household risk-taking, we establish a non-trivial relationship between optimal bank contributions and household risk-aversion: Higher risk-aversion optimally induces higher contributions when guarantees exceed a threshold; otherwise, higher contributions shall be observed in economies with less risk-averse households.","PeriodicalId":405783,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Financial Institutions (Topic)","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2021-07-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Optimal Bank Contributions and Household Risk-Aversion\",\"authors\":\"S. Papageorgiou\",\"doi\":\"10.2139/ssrn.3889332\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"We study bank contributions that ex ante fund government guarantees supported by a fiscal backstop in a general equilibrium setting where banks intermediate between risk-averse households and state-contingent investments. We offer an analytical characterization of optimal bank contributions as a function of household risk-aversion and guarantees. Showing that higher risk-aversion expedites the way bank contributions internalize guarantees' boost of household risk-taking, we establish a non-trivial relationship between optimal bank contributions and household risk-aversion: Higher risk-aversion optimally induces higher contributions when guarantees exceed a threshold; otherwise, higher contributions shall be observed in economies with less risk-averse households.\",\"PeriodicalId\":405783,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"PSN: Financial Institutions (Topic)\",\"volume\":\"1 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2021-07-19\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"PSN: Financial Institutions (Topic)\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3889332\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"PSN: Financial Institutions (Topic)","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3889332","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
Optimal Bank Contributions and Household Risk-Aversion
We study bank contributions that ex ante fund government guarantees supported by a fiscal backstop in a general equilibrium setting where banks intermediate between risk-averse households and state-contingent investments. We offer an analytical characterization of optimal bank contributions as a function of household risk-aversion and guarantees. Showing that higher risk-aversion expedites the way bank contributions internalize guarantees' boost of household risk-taking, we establish a non-trivial relationship between optimal bank contributions and household risk-aversion: Higher risk-aversion optimally induces higher contributions when guarantees exceed a threshold; otherwise, higher contributions shall be observed in economies with less risk-averse households.