新加坡Sling:强制如何治愈金融基准治理的后遗症

J. O'Brien
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引用次数: 3

摘要

国际证券监督管理委员会组织(IOSCO)已正式制定了一套原则,旨在恢复对一系列具有系统重要性的金融基准的信心。值得注意的是,国际证监会组织行动迅速,并得到了G20的认可。然而,尚不清楚这些原则是否为可持续改革提供了基础。这源于国际证监会组织内部关于基于假设提交的基准是否可以改革或必须由以观察到的交易为基础的系统所取代的截然相反的观点。结果,这些原则只是纸上添花,而没有解决在一桩仍在蔓延的丑闻中暴露出来的核心道德缺陷。本文探讨了IOSCO过程如何以及为什么具有优先于实质的象征意义。然后评估另一种方法。新加坡金融管理局(MAS)开发了一种创新的解决方案,授权为新加坡银行间同业拆借利率(Sibor)提供服务的银行优先考虑基准的完整性,而不是个人机构的声誉或诉讼风险。这种风险管理的监管重组整合了规则、原则和社会规范,以形成约束。本文的结论是,这种整体方法,一旦针对特定市场的特定政治、经济和文化维度进行校准,就更有可能嵌入道德决策,降低制度腐败的风险,并实现对社会有益的结果。
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Singapore Sling: How Coercion May Cure the Hangover in Financial Benchmark Governance
The International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) has formalized a set of principles designed to restore confidence in a range of systemically important financial benchmarks. The alacrity with which IOSCO has moved and its endorsement by the G20 is notable. It is far from clear, however, whether the principles provide a basis for sustainable reform. This derives from diametrically conflicting views within IOSCO as to whether benchmarks based on hypothetical submissions can be reformed or must be replaced by systems anchored in observed transactions. As a consequence the principles paper over rather than resolve core ethical deficiencies exposed in a still metastasizing scandal. The paper examines how and why the IOSCO process has privileged symbolism over substance. It then evaluates an alternative approach. The Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS) has developed an innovative solution whereby contributing banks to the Singapore Interbank Offered Rate (Sibor) are mandated to privilege the integrity of the benchmark over individual institutional reputational or litigation risk. This regulatory re-engineering of risk management integrates rules, principles and social norms to forge restraint. The paper concludes that this holistic approach, once calibrated to the specific political, economic and cultural dimensions of specific markets, is more likely to embed ethical decision-making, reduce the risk of institutional corruption and achieve socially beneficial outcomes.
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