随机抽签顺序会增加无效票:来自澳大利亚的证据

Y. Horiuchi, Alexandra Lange
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引用次数: 3

摘要

选举候选人的随机投票顺序虽然避免了在投票中处于有利地位的候选人获得不公平的优势,但也给需要在没有线索的情况下寻找自己喜欢的候选人的选民带来了额外的认知压力。这种压力可能会增加选民犯错的可能性。使用来自澳大利亚众议院选举的超过68,000个投票站的数据,我们表明,在选票中排名靠前的候选人越强,非正式选票(即无效和未记录的选票)的百分比越小。这是因为,对于大多数选民来说,最有利的候选人出现在最容易找到的位置上。当候选人数量很大时,这种影响的幅度尤其大。我们的发现表明,设计一种选票来最大化候选人之间的公平可能会带来意想不到的后果,这与另一个重要的规范原则——最大化(有效)选民参与——不一致。
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Randomized Ballot Order Can Increase Invalid Votes: Evidence from Australia
Randomized ballot order of electoral candidates prevents unfair advantages for candidates with favorable positions on a ballot, but it also places additional cognitive strain on voters who need to search for their preferred candidates without clues. This strain could increase voters' probability of making errors. Using more than 68,000 polling-place level data from Australian House of Representatives elections, we show that the stronger the candidate at the top of a ballot, the smaller the percentage of informal (i.e., invalid and unrecorded) votes. This is because, for a larger number of voters, the most favorable candidate appears at the easiest-to-find position. The magnitude of this effect is particularly large when the number of candidates is large. Our finding implies that designing a ballot to maximize fairness among candidates could bring about an unintended consequence that is inconsistent with another important normative principle -- maximized (valid) voter participation.
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